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The linguistic world contains an array of terms and concepts which, in their literal sense at 
least, appear to belong primarily to the modern discipline of biology. We speak, for example, 
of the evolution of languages, of living languages, of dead or extinct languages, of genetically 
related languages and of the ecology of languages, to name but a few. Vulnerable, critically 
endangered and extinct are used by international bodies to classify the status of biological 
species and languages alike, and languages have in the past been described quite literally as 
living organisms. The aim of this dissertation is to examine where research currently stands 
on the parallels between biological species and languages, the processes which might link 
them, and the reasons why these comparisons have persisted over such a long period.  
Considerable attention will be paid in this regard to the role of culture as both a possible 
bridge and a potential barrier between language and life, given that the term is often used in 
binary opposition to nature on the one hand, and in a rather vague alliance with language in 
the term “language and culture” on the other. Defining precisely what culture is, and its 
relationship to biology and language alike, will therefore be a major objective. It is hoped that 






The formation of different languages and of distinct species, and the proofs that 
both have been developed through a gradual process, are curiously parallel. 
 
So said Charles Darwin in his 1871 book The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to 
Sex, (p. 89).  The quote is paraphrased in the title of this dissertation, although, as will be 
seen, this is far from the first time that it has struck a chord. For example, it can clearly be 
seen that the parallels in question, as noted by the author, are those shared by different 
languages and distinct species. This suggests not only a specific analogy between these two 
particular categories as opposed to other potential candidates, but also that languages and 
species are identifiable as such. Were this not so, we could not possibly know whether a 
language or species had been formed or developed in the first place. The gradual process 
marks yet another parallel, and so a brief consideration of both languages and species is 
offered below.    
  
1.1 Languages and species  
Language is the primary means of communication of the human species. It is 
produced by combining arbitrary phonic or visual symbols into larger units for the purposes 
of communication. Any examination of it, however, would quickly find, not one, but a wide 
variety of different examples of this phenomenon. Estimates for the number of languages 
found across the world are usually in the range of between 6,000 and 7,000 (including at least 
130 sign languages). The biocultural diversity questionnaire used later in this dissertation has 
used 6,500 as an approximation, based on UNESCO figures. It should also be noted that 
languages will here be treated as synonymous with “natural languages”, understood to mean 
languages which have evolved through repetitive use and replication, either spoken or signed, 




Written languages, on the other hand, are a form of technology used to convey a 
natural language in writing, “an optional accessory” as described by Pinker (1994, p. 16). 
There are no human communities without language, and individuals without it are so rare as 
to cause a sensation, with a possible upper percentage of less than 0.01% of the world’s 
population (Downey, 2010). The equivalent figure for people without literacy skills, on the 
other hand, currently stands at roughly 1,000 times that number, at approximately 750 million 
people, or 10% of the world’s population. These though, at least have the benefit of 
belonging to a speech community (UNESCO, 2017).  
It is not known when humans first used speech, and estimates vary from about 50,000 
to two million years ago, with 200,000 years an apparent compromise (List et al, 2016, p. 2). 
The languages of the world are divided into some 140 or so families based on supposed 
common ancestry. These families are themselves often divided into branches, which are in 
turn divided into groups in the manner of a family tree. Indo-European is the most widely 
studied family, and a simplified sketch of its branches can be seen in Figure 1:   





There are several ways in which languages can be considered independently of 
individual speakers. For example, if the number of speakers of every language across the 
world were totalled, the resulting figure would be considerably greater than the total number 
of people. This, of course, is because more than half of the world’s population is at least 
bilingual. In addition, no speaker, not even a lexicographer, ever succeeds in using all the 
words of a particular language, and so the full corpus of a language may be considered to be 
the sum total of all the utterances of all its speakers, but far in excess of the reach of any one 
of them. Languages are bounded and can be identified, even if the ties that bind them may be 
a little loose. Dialect continua, for example, may blur the distinction between one language 
and another, but difficulties such as these are also present in biology when identifying 
subspecies from species.  
When considering analogies between biological species and languages, it is worth 
noting at the outset that there are far more of the former than the latter, and also that they 
have existed over much greater timescales.  However, as is the case with languages, no 
investigation into life on Earth would ever find a “thing” called life, but instead, an enormous 
variety of individual living organisms, from bacteria to fungi to plants and animals, which 
share the defining characteristics of life. These, just like languages, are taxonomically 
organised in hierarchical levels of classification which are believed to indicate shared 
common ancestry. The three-domain system of classifying biological organisms uses the 
domains of Archaea, Bacteria and Eukaryota as the highest levels of eight major taxonomic 
ranks. In the case of the first two, both of which are prokaryotic (i.e. organisms whose cells 
lack a nucleus and which are also overwhelmingly unicellular), it is notoriously difficult to 
estimate numbers, not only because of their (small) size and (large) number, but also because 
their methods of asexual reproduction make “species” identification difficult, if not 




will be examined later. The eight main taxonomic ranks (which do not include intermediate 
minor rankings such as superfamily or subspecies) can be seen in Figure 2:    
Figure 2: Major taxonomic ranks of biological classification  
 
All forms of life will communicate in some way, including, for example, through 
chemical exchange, physical movement towards or away from another organism, olfactory 
messages, or complex auditory or visual symbols. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that 
human language is utilised by one species alone, and therefore unique amongst 
communication systems. That said, it is not unique in being unique. There is no equivalent 
anywhere in the animal kingdom, for instance, to the honeybee waggle dance (Trask, 2004, 
p.10), the identification of which was sufficient to earn its discoverer a Nobel prize. This 
point is worthy of consideration as a counterbalance to claims of human uniqueness, given 
that many other species also have their own unique characteristics. Humans, for example, 
lack the echolocation and magnetic orientation abilities of various species, the ability to 




Although Darwin specifically noted parallels at the most fundamental levels of 
languages and species, there are numerous other analogies between language and life in 
general which could be, and have been, made to illustrate the potential hierarchical and 
multileveled nature of both. Some of these are exemplified in the table below:  
Table 1: Potential hierarchical analogies between language and life 
Language  Life 
Family Family 
Branch Subfamily 
Group  Genus  
Languages  Species 
Dialect  Subspecies 
Idiolect Organism  
Morpheme Cell 
Phoneme Gene  
 
Not all of the main levels are shown here due to the much larger number of living 
things as opposed to languages, however the use of taxonomic levels with languages appears 
to be less precise than in biological taxonomy anyway. The Routledge Language Family 
Series of publications, for instance, contains volumes on not only the Turkic, Dravidian and 
Indo-European families, but also the Celtic, Romance, Germanic and Slavonic languages, all 
of which are themselves branches of Indo-European. Nevertheless, the principle of gradual 
descent from a common ancestor is evident in both the biological and linguistic cases. At the 
same time, in terms of processes, we can no doubt add the likes of variation, competition and 
inheritance, as well as the existence of species and language “barriers” to the list of analogies 




1.2 General themes and objectives  
It should be remembered that languages and species do not require academic study by 
human beings in order to proceed. Indeed, they managed perfectly well without such activity 
for tens of thousands of years in the case of the former, and millions in the case of the latter. 
A sharp distinction therefore needs to be drawn between actual languages and living things 
on the one hand, and the academic disciplines of linguistics and biology on the other, which 
are based upon our interpretations of how best to categorise the subject matter of particular 
disciplines. Given that this thesis is concerned with such interpretations and categorisations, it 
contains within a number of themes and objectives. There are four themes, numbered for 
convenience, as follows:  
Theme 1: The relationship between language and animal communication; 
Theme 2: Parallels between historical linguistics and evolutionary biology; 
Theme 3: Parallels between linguistic and biological ecology;  
Theme 4: The relationship of culture to both language and biology.  
These have been chosen as it is felt that each may have a part to play in the parallels shared 
between languages and species. Human language, for example, is ultimately a form of animal 
communication. To deny this would be to deny, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary, the status of homo sapiens as an animal species. Consequently, its relationship to 
other animal communication systems is here considered a topic of relevance covered by 
Theme 1. As noted above, evolutionary parallels between languages and species were first 
recognised in the nineteenth century, and these are the subject of Theme 2. An additional 
parallel, which could not have been foreseen at that time, has since become apparent, namely 
the unprecedented loss of diversity in both the biological and linguistic spheres. This more 
recent analogy, then, allows for a wide range of comparisons within an ecological context, 




within their respective environments in order for them to survive, and this forms the basis of 
Theme 3. This, in turn, has led to the growth of the concept of biocultural diversity, labelled 
as the sum total of the world’s diversity in its biological, linguistic and cultural forms. We 
have therefore seen, in the present century, a shift towards looking at all aspects of diversity 
as elements of a larger whole, which is perhaps more in keeping with attitudes of the 
nineteenth. These stand in stark contrast to the twentieth century, where an increase in 
specialisation and a splitting of disciplines into the “two cultures” of natural sciences on the 
one hand, and humanities and social sciences on the other, has led to biology and linguistics 
landing on opposite sides of the academic fence. Consequently, via the two cultures and 
biocultural diversity, the relationship between culture and both language and biology 
repeatedly raises its head and subsequently demands attention as the fourth and final theme.   
Interwoven with these four themes stand eight objectives, as shown below: 
Objective 1: To seek out the findings of research into comparisons between animal 
communication and human language, particularly with regard to the supposed uniqueness 
of language;  
Objective 2: To examine why so many concepts and terms are shared between biology 
and linguistics in the first place; 
Objective 3: To establish whether or not researchers from linguistic and biological fields 
collaborate in areas of possible overlap; 
Objective 4: To investigate whether the existence of the “two cultures” is a manifestation 
of dualism and a hindrance to academic collaboration between the two fields;  
Objective 5: To examine whether or not the concept of biocultural diversity has the 
potential to be a unifying force; 
Objective 6: To see if public attitudes towards linguistic diversity are similar in principle 




Objective 7: To examine definitions and interpretations of “culture” and “cultural 
evolution” alongside some other familiar terms such as “environment” and “technology”; 
Objective 8: To reach some conclusions on the relationship between language, culture 
and biology. 
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1.3 Literature review 
Although the curious parallels reference comes from The Descent of Man, Charles 
Darwin is known to have reflected on the nature of language as early as 1837 following his 
return from the voyage on the Beagle, where he noted that “all speculations on the origins of 
language must presume it originates slowly” and that “we cannot doubt that language is an 
altering element” (Richards, 2002, p. 2). Any review of relevant literature must therefore also 
include his On the Origin of Species, first published in 1859. After all, were it not for this 
book, there would be no evolutionary theory with which to compare species and languages in 
the first place. It is also worth noting that he chooses relationships between languages as an 
illustration to show that “the natural system is genealogical in its arrangement” (Darwin, 
1859, p. 422). 
He was obviously influenced by the works of others. The Geological Evidences of the 
Antiquity of Man was written in 1863 by his friend Charles Lyell, who devotes all of chapter 
xxiii to a very relevant topic, namely the ‘Origin and Development of Languages and Species 
Compared’. Lyell notes that “we may compare the persistency of languages, or the tendency 
of each generation to adopt without change the vocabulary of its predecessor, to the force of 
inheritance in the organic world” (p. 467). Living languages, like organic life, are derived 
from extinct ones (p. 461), they are part of a “struggle for existence” reminiscent of the 
struggle for life in the title of Darwin’s Origin, and subject to “powerful causes of selection” 
(p. 463) which see one dialect triumph over another. All of this takes place without speakers 
being necessarily aware of it (ibid). Finally, languages are subject to a slow and gradual 
extinction, and, once extinct “can never be revived, since the same assemblage of conditions 




Lyell clearly believed that languages changed by some kind of natural force which was 
beyond the control of their speakers. Even one venerated by its users would be “incapable of 
permanently maintaining its ground” (p. 464). His respect for languages as natural 
phenomena, though, pales when compared to August Schleicher, a German linguist who took 
an interest in Darwin’s theory. He is known to have produced family trees (Stammbäume) 
illustrating the relationship between different languages as early as 1853, prior to Darwin’s 
Origin. Indeed, he is frequently acknowledged as “the first linguist to portray language 
development using the figure of a tree” (Richards, 2002, p. 23). In 1863 he wrote Die 
Darwinsche Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft. His work was translated into English in 
1869 under the title Darwinism tested by the science of language, and according to Richards 
(p. 37), “Schleicher’s greatest and lasting contribution to evolutionary understanding may 
simply be his use of a Stammbaum to illustrate the descent of languages”, which, it is worth 
remembering, preceded its equivalent use for biological species. His thesis however, showed 
a vision of languages themselves as living things, and claimed that:  
• Languages are organisms of nature and have never been directed by the will of man;  
• They rise and develop according to definite laws; they grow old, and die out;  
• They are subject to phenomena which we embrace under the name of “life”;  
• The science of language is consequently a natural science;  
• Its method is generally altogether the same as that of any other natural science. 
(Schleicher, 1863, pp. 20–21) 
There was therefore a period in the nineteenth century when evolutionary concepts were 
openly shared between what would now be called linguistics and biology. This state of 
affairs, however, was not destined to last. The Société de Linguistique de Paris famously 




the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ferdinand de Saussure shifted the emphasis 
in linguistics from the diachronic to the synchronic, thereby “killing the field that had borne 
him” (Aranoff, 2017, p. 450). Within the social sciences in general, evolution became 
discredited, accused of Social Darwinism, and largely shunned. Einar Haugen’s 1971 paper 
The Ecology of Language, which stated that language ecology may be defined as the study of 
interactions between any given language and its environment, hails the beginning of a new 
ecological metaphor and another parallel between linguistics and biology. As will be seen, 
however, this metaphor has run into trouble.  
A significant development of the latter decades of the twentieth century was the growth of 
the concept of cultural evolution, and it is worth noting that it was brought to prominence by 
those who specialised in evolution, rather than those who specialised in culture. In 1975, 
evolutionary biologist Edward. O. Wilson produced his Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, on 
social behaviour in animals. Much of its content was safely confined within ethology and 
animal communication. This was not always the case, though, as, on occasion, comparisons 
with humans were made, including the characteristics of both language and culture. All 
aspects of culture, according to Wilson, were separated from animal tradition by a matter of 
degree only, with one exception, namely language, “which is truly unique” (p. 87). Wilson 
received criticism from scholars within his own discipline as well as outside of it. Some of 
the anger directed at him, however, was no doubt down to his daring to invade the turf of 
other academic disciplines (and also pass judgement on them), by imagining a macroscopic 
examination of those academic subjects which study all of our planet’s social animals, and 
arriving at a conclusion whereby “the humanities and social sciences shrink to specialized 
branches of biology” (p. 271). Seeing their disciplines shrunk in this way was always likely 




There is no specific reference to linguistics in the above quote, but its practitioners were 
not to escape lightly either. On the question of the existence of a universal grammar, Wilson 
maintains that this is a difficult question to answer because “most attempts to generalize the 
rules of deep grammar have been based on the semantic content of one particular language” 
(p. 283). A fair cop, some might argue. However, even more annoying than using one 
language to try and establish universals was the unscientific attitude employed by them while 
so doing, and the production of oblique literature which frustrated natural scientists. He 
subsequently concludes that “this discipline, one of the most important in all of science, is 
ripe for the application of rigorous theory and properly meshed experimental investigation” 
(ibid). Rather than undermining the importance of the science of language, then, this quote 
seems to be expressing genuine frustration at a perceived lack of progress in it. Sociobiology 
was not primarily concerned with the study of language or even human culture more broadly, 
however, it did reawaken the so-called nature/nurture debate and let the Darwinian genie out 
of its bottle after an absence of almost a century which had seen blank slates and purely 
synchronic studies prevail. It is this which marks its significance. Darwinism had reached out 
to the social sciences rather than the reverse, and this process would continue.  
The following year saw the publication of Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene. This 
book promoted the idea of a gene-centred view of evolution, as opposed to an emphasis on 
organisms or group behaviour. Largely concerned with evolutionary biology in general, its 
last chapter was, however, entitled Memes: the new replicators. Here he turns his attention 
towards man, noting that “most of what is unusual about man can be summed up in one word: 
‘culture’.” (Dawkins, 1976, p. 189). The first examples of culture deal with language, but the 
author quickly explains that “language is only one example out of many” (p. 190). Further 




engineering and technology, all evolve in historical time in a way that looks like highly 
speeded up genetic evolution, but has really nothing to do with genetic evolution” (ibid).   
Dawkins was certainly not the first to see the analogy between these (and admits so) but his 
book did provide a catalyst for propelling it into the mainstream. He then goes so far as to say 
that “we must begin by throwing out the gene as the sole basis for our ideas on evolution” (p. 
191) and adds to it the concept of the meme, a cultural replicator of ideas analogous to the 
gene. We now see the basis for the birth of a new academic discipline called memetics, which 
in turn would develop into variations of the same theme known as gene-culture coevolution 
or dual-inheritance theory. Significantly, these theories are held to be in keeping with, and 
indeed part of, a Darwinian approach. It is, however, interesting to note that between Wilson 
and Dawkins we already have an example of the ambiguous relationship between language 
and culture. Language cannot be both “truly unique” and also “one example out of many”.  
In 1982, Dawkins wrote his sequel to The Selfish Gene entitled The Extended 
Phenotype, and in the preface lists “humanists interested in evolutionary science” as part of 
his target audience. Here, Dawkins expands upon his gene-centred theory to include aspects 
external to the organism itself, noting that “the phenotypic effects of a gene are the tools by 
which it levers itself into the next generation, and these tools may 'extend' far outside the 
body in which the gene sits”. Examples include various kinds of niche construction such as 
birds’ nests, beavers’ dams, termite mounds and so on. This of course has implications for the 
study of human culture, particularly cultural artefacts of all kinds. Critically, Dawkins in this 
book defines a replicator as “anything in the universe of which copies are made” (p. 83) “…. 
purposely defined in a general way, so that it does not even have to refer to DNA” (p. 87). 
Dawkins adds that he is “indeed, quite sympathetic towards the idea that human culture 




(ibid). The time was now ripe, so it seemed, for an innovative analysis of human culture 
within its own evolutionary framework.  
The third book in the Dawkins trilogy is his 1986 publication, The Blind Watchmaker. 
The title is based upon a quote from William Paley’s 1802 book Natural Theology where the 
author imagines himself happening upon a watch and concluding that “there must have 
existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers, who formed the 
watch for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its 
construction, and designed its use”. This is of course an analogy for the existence of a 
designer, a creator of complex things in the form of God.  Dawkins’ book aims to prove 
conclusively that a complicated design does not require a complicated designer, and that 
Darwinian natural selection is sufficient to explain the complexity of the living world without 
the need to invoke a creator. In keeping with his thesis in The Extended Phenotype, Dawkins 
treats “man-made artefacts like computers and cars…firmly…as biological objects” 
(Dawkins, 1986, p.1) because they are clearly the product of biological objects, and an 
indication of the presence of life. As far as the creation of artefacts is concerned, then, he is 
obviously in agreement with Paley. They part company, however when it comes, not to the 
artefact itself, but to the artefact’s designer, as illustrated in the following: 
Natural selection, the blind, unconscious, automatic process which Darwin 
discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the existence and 
apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It has no mind and 
no mind’s eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight, no 
sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind 
watchmaker. (Dawkins, 1986, p. 5)  
 
Where, though, do languages fit into all of this? Steven Pinker and Paul Bloom in their 
1990 article “Natural language and natural selection” maintain that language evolved “by a 
conventional neo-Darwinian process” (p. 707) in line with natural selection. They make the 




they present a list of facts which suggest that “the ability to use a natural language belongs 
more to the study of human biology than human culture; it is a topic like echolocation in bats 
or stereopsis in monkeys, not like writing or the wheel” (ibid). Contrary, then, to Dawkins’ 
assumption that language is one of many elements of culture, Pinker and Bloom here make 
the case for language being rather different, and Pinker (1994) subsequently goes on to 
dispense with culture altogether, asserting that language is an “instinct”. The essence of his 
thesis is worth quoting in full:  
Language is not a cultural artifact that we learn the way we learn to tell time or 
how the federal government works. Instead it is a distinct piece of the biological 
makeup of our brains. Language is a complex, specialized skill, which develops 
in the child spontaneously, without conscious effort or formal instruction, is 
deployed without awareness of its underlying logic, is qualitatively the same in 
every individual, and is distinct from the more general abilities to process 
information or behave intelligently. (p. 18)  
There are some bold claims here, which, as we shall see, have not gone unchallenged. Pinker 
then goes on to compare the human language faculty with spiders’ ability to spin webs, and 
asserts that “language is no more a cultural invention than is upright posture” nor is it “a 
manifestation of a general capacity to use symbols” (ibid).  
In 1998, Edward O. Wilson returns with his Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. 
Whilst pleading for convergence, he bemoans the lack of progress in the social sciences, and 
their attempts at proceeding “largely without linkage to the natural sciences” (p. 200). The 
chapter From Genes to Culture offers an account of dual-inheritance theory, giving a nod 
towards both Pinker’s language instinct and Dawkins’ meme along the way, in the search for 
the basic unit of culture which corresponds to the gene. Gene-culture coevolution, is, for 
Wilson, “the conceptual keystone of the bridge between science and the humanities” (p. 150). 
Regardless of individual differences which may have existed between them, therefore, the 




advocates of Darwinism towards explanations of phenomena which had traditionally been 
considered to be solely in the cultural realm.  
The new millennium saw evolutionary approaches to language continue full steam 
ahead. From the outset, new publications addressed issues such as language change from an 
evolutionary perspective. Advancements in animal communication gave a greater insight into 
intraspecies transmission and parallels with human language, while work on cultural 
evolution often used language to illustrate this phenomenon in action. Due to the increase in 
academic specialisation that had taken place by the end of the twentieth century, these 
different aspects are shown below in accordance with the four themes of this dissertation.  
 
1.3.1   Language and animal communication 
Given that language is the primary intraspecific communication system of humanity 
as an animal species, it follows that animal communication may be able to offer some 
comparisons. Many animal species use vocalisations to communicate, and recent studies have 
shown that a variety of these, including wolves, orcas, sperm whales and cod, have regional 
“accents” or “dialects”. Vocalisation, however, is not the same thing as “vocal learning”, 
defined as the ability to acquire or modify vocalisations as a result of auditory experience 
(Lattenkamp and Vernes, 2018, p. 209), which is an essential prerequisite for human 
language. Vocal learning ability has only been found in certain groups of mammals and birds, 
namely humans, cetaceans, pinnipeds, bats, elephants, goats, parrots, hummingbirds and 
songbirds (ibid). It can be seen that apes and monkeys are missing from this list. Rather 
surprisingly then, especially when considering the effort which has been put into assessing 
them, “there is sparse evidence that our closest relatives, nonhuman primates, have the 




particularly closely related to each other, and even within these, a distinction can be drawn 
between those species which can faithfully reproduce only the vocalisations of their own 
species, and those which can mimic other species, such as the proverbial “pretty Polly” 
parrot, and the appropriately-named mockingbird. There can be little doubt, in fact, that the 
closest parallels in the animal kingdom to human language are to be found, not in primate 
vocalisations, but in birdsong. Darwin said as much in The Descent of Man.  
Recent work undertaken by Robert Lachlan and Stephen Nowicki has shed new light 
on this, and in their article ‘Context-dependent categorical perception in a songbird’ (Lachlan 
and Nowicki, 2015) they claim that their study “demonstrates that the phonology and 
perception of swamp sparrow songs share even more features with human phonology and 
speech perception than previously suspected” (p. 1896). This is because phoneme 
categorisations in the notes of swamp sparrow songs “suggest for the first time that this 
central characteristic of human phonology is also found in a nonhuman communication 
system” (p. 1892). Despite not being relevant to all aspects of human language such as 
syntax, the phonological parallels are nevertheless highly significant, as “although speakers 
and listeners are generally unaware of the fact, many phonemic categories in speech vary in 
their structure and in how they are perceived, depending on linguistic context” (ibid). 
Phonological changes of course also drive language change, and one of the authors’ 
conclusions is that, the mechanisms underpinning complex phonology, due to their presence 
in both human speech and swamp sparrow song, may have evolved before syntax and 
semantics, which only exist in human speech, and therefore “may have their origins in the 
logic of assessment signals that govern much of animal communication” (p. 1896). The same 
authors, this time in conjunction with Oliver Ratmann, went on to produce the paper ‘Cultural 
conformity generates extremely stable traditions in bird song’ (Lachlan, Ratmann and 




The article deals primarily with conformist bias, and the authors assert that their “results 
demonstrate conformist bias in natural animal behaviour and show that this, along with 
moderately precise learning, may support traditions whose stability rivals those of humans” 
(p. 1). The subject matter was again phonological, with a simulated model based on 
recordings of 615 swamp swallow song repertoires being used to estimate the stability of 
syllable types. The paper notes that, according to the parameters of their model, “the average 
age of the oldest syllable type in each population was 1537 years, and 8.6% of syllable types 
(and 26.5% of all syllables) were older than 500 years” (p.5). These time frames are quite 
staggering, and can be compared in length to periods of human languages (for example Old, 
Middle and Modern English). Indeed, the authors’ most striking claim is that their findings 
“suggest that the ability to transmit traditions with precision can no longer be considered a 
fundamental difference between how human and non-human cultures evolve” (p. 6).   
 
1.3.2  Historical linguistics and evolutionary biology 
The year 2000 saw the publication of William Croft’s innovative Explaining 
Language Change: An Evolutionary Approach. The author’s preface notes that the book 
“presents a framework for understanding language change as a fundamentally evolutionary 
phenomenon” (xiii) and that a speaker’s knowledge of grammar cannot be disentangled 
“from the act of using language” (ibid). These factors form the backbone to the central thesis, 
namely that “the proper linguistic equivalent to the genome was not a speaker’s grammar but 
the utterance” (xiv). Influenced by David Hull’s generalised theory of selection for the 
evolution of concepts as well as organisms, Croft goes on the hunt for the unit of specifically 
linguistic selection to sit alongside physiological genes and cultural memes, and subsequently 




concerned, he criticises the tendency towards zoo-centric thinking so often in evidence and 
asserts that “a language system is more like a plant than an animal” (p. 230). His was the first 
attempt at steering evolutionary thinking about languages away from the assumption that 
parallels mean parallels with animal evolution. It is a ground-breaking and influential work. 
Not everyone, however, has been convinced by this approach. For example, although praised 
as an alternative to Chomskyan views of “I-language” by emphasising the “E-language” of 
real-life language use, a review of the book by Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy (2003) left him 
“unconvinced” (p. 205) that Croft had succeeded in his central purpose of using evolutionary 
theory to explain language change. One “disquieting” (p. 204) difference between biological 
evolutionary theory and the linguistic evolutionary theory proposed by Croft was the way in 
which the term “population” had been defined. This issue is discussed further in 3.6.2 below.  
In 2005, a paper by Quentin D. Atkinson and Russell D. Gray entitled ‘Curious 
Parallels and Curious Connections—Phylogenetic Thinking in Biology and Historical 
Linguistics’ was published in Systematic Biology. It reviews parallels between biological and 
linguistic evolution and the development of phylogenetic methods in both evolutionary 
biology and historical linguistics. A central feature of the article is that due to analogous 
processes between languages and living things, both linguists and biologists need to ask 
similar questions, and the authors find it likely that these two fields, “which have evolved 
along related paths throughout their history” (p. 514) will remain curiously and productively 
connected (p. 524). It lists twelve fundamental features of biological and linguistic evolution 
which are “demonstrably analogous” (see Table 3). The table provides a good summary of 
similarities between the two, but further examples can be seen within the article itself. 
Inheritance is common to both species and languages, with DNA sequences passed on in the 
case of the former, and phonemes and vocabulary in the latter. Homologies indicate shared 




which initiates selection processes. Ultimately, this produces lineage splits, causing 
cladogenesis and speciation. Contact may then lead to horizontal transfer and hybridisation, 
with eventual extinction and subsequent fossilisation. One feature missing from this quite 
extensive list of analogies is competition, whereby both species and languages have to 
compete for a finite amount of resources from their respective environments in order to 
maintain their existence.  Nevertheless, the parallels listed are numerous, fundamental and 
eerily similar in function, despite the objects of study being substantially different. That said, 
given Richard Dawkins’ insistence (1.3 above) that man-made artefacts should be treated as 
biological objects because they are an indication of the presence of life, then there may be 
every reason to treat “fossils” carved on stone in a similar same way to fossils made of bone.  
Table 3: “Demonstrably analogous” biological and linguistic evolutionary features 
(after Atkinson and Gray, 2005) 
Biological evolution  Linguistic evolution  
Discrete characters  Lexicon, syntax, and phonology  
Homologies  Cognates  
Mutation  Innovation  
Drift  Drift  
Natural selection  Social selection  
Cladogenesis  Lineage splits  
Horizontal gene transfer  Borrowing  
Plant hybrids  Language Creoles  
Correlated genotypes/phenotypes  Correlated cultural terms  
Geographic clines  Dialects/dialect chains  
Fossils  Ancient texts  





Eleven years later, the article ‘Unity and disunity in evolutionary sciences: process-
based analogies open common research avenues for biology and linguistics’ by Johann-
Mattis List et al was published in Biology Direct (2016, 11:39). This deals with much the 
same phenomena as Atkinson and Gray, and the abstract of the article refers to the 
“surprising similarities between the evolution of life forms and languages” (p. 1). 
Evolutionary biology and historical linguistics are noted as the academic disciplines which 
specialise in these two fields (p. 2). Nevertheless, the research objects of the two disciplines 
differ greatly, evolutionary biology examining substantial objects with a concrete physical 
manifestation, whereas historical linguistics deals with “intellectual objects” which, quoting 
Popper, are “products of the human mind” (ibid). This reflects a dualist, or indeed pluralist, 
position if Popper’s “three worlds” are accepted. A critique of object-based analogies, such as 
comparing words to cells, languages to species and so on, leads to the “Unique Selling Point” 
of this article, namely that process-based rather than object-based analogies provide more 
beneficial results via a unifying explanatory framework of evolutionary processes, because 
“general evolution cannot be studied from within one discipline alone” (p. 10).  Figure 3 
below, taken from their article, consists of seventeen processes in three categories selected by 
the authors, viz, seven specifically linguistic, four specifically biological, and six analogous 
processes, as opposed to the twelve features proposed by Atkinson and Gray. One analogous 
process which is prominent in both List et al and Atkinson and Gray is the borrowing of 
words and horizontal (or lateral) gene transfer. In 2014, the lead author of the above article, 
Johann-Mattis List, produced another on that very topic entitled ‘Networks of lexical 
borrowing and lateral gene transfer in language and genome evolution’. It rightly notes that 
“borrowing is a constitutive part of language history” (p. 143) which can lead to difficulties 




branches on a linguistic family tree. There are still parallels with biological organisms 
though, as “language history bears a close resemblance to prokaryote evolution” (p. 144).  
Figure 3: Linguistic and biological evolutionary processes (after List et al, 2016) 
 
 
To the above efforts can be added the work of Nathalie Gontier and her Applied 
Evolutionary Epistemology (AEE) framework, first mooted in 2012. In 2017, she produced 
two papers on language evolution specifically. The first: ‘What are the Units of Language 
Evolution?’ (2017a) includes a definition of applied evolutionary epistemology as “the 
phenomena where units evolve at levels of an ontological hierarchy by mechanisms” (p. 235), 
and the task is to identify these mechanisms. Subsequently, Gontier produced a “sequel” to 
this paper entitled ‘What are the levels and mechanisms/processes of language evolution?’ 




stresses that evolution is not synonymous with, or restricted to, that which evolves by natural 
selection. Evolution occurs when units change at levels of an ontological hierarchy by 
mechanisms (p. 14) and can be extended to include not only the cultural, but also the 
inorganic (p. 13). Put another way, there are different kinds of evolution (p. 18), and, 
according to Gontier, accepting an evolutionary worldview implies that “there cannot exist 
anything in this world that did not evolve” (p. 23), including inorganic matter. In conclusion, 
the author notes that “gene-culture coevolutionary theorists have long been engaged in 
finding mechanisms peculiar to cultural evolution, and it is highly likely that language 
evolution will prove to have some peculiar mechanisms too” (p. 40).   
 
1.3.3 Linguistic ecology and biocultural diversity 
Salikoko Mufwene’s The Ecology of Language Evolution was published in 2001. 
Despite asserting that “by evolution, I mean nothing more than the long-term changes 
undergone by a language (variety) over a period of time” (loc. 304), the author nevertheless 
invites us to think of languages as analogous to species rather than organisms, makes constant 
references to speciation, and also submits that “a language is more of the parasitic symbiotic 
kind of species than of the animal kind” (loc. 2313). In this scenario, speakers are seen as 
“hosts”, but it represents another, albeit different, attempt at emphasising that biological 
evolution does not apply to animals only, there are other forms of life which may provide 
more appropriate analogies for languages. The book makes the important point that language 
change can take place without contact with other languages (internal ecology) and that this 
“contact as an ecological factor is everywhere in our day-to-day interactions. It nurtures the 
invisible hand that executes change” (loc. 400). This invisibility serves to reinforce the point 
that evolution “has no purpose or defined goals. It should not be interpreted as progress” (loc. 




This ecological approach has not gone without criticism. In response to a more recent 
paper by Mufwene, for example, Willans and Jukes (2017) ask ‘How far can the language 
ecology metaphor take us?’ and argue, from the particular perspective of Pacific languages, 
that the “ecology metaphor does not ultimately offer a compelling basis for an overarching 
theory of language vitality” (p. 263) and that drawing ecological parallels by comparing 
languages to species removes “the human experience” (p. 272) from the debate around such a 
theory. The extent to which linguists should become advocates for the preservation of 
linguistic diversity is another related issue. However, it is not apparent why the framework as 
proposed by Mufwene need influence any of these matters in one direction or the other, just 
as Darwin’s theory of evolution neither prevents nor insists upon biologists being advocates 
for biodiversity.  
In the midst of all these biological and linguistic analogies, a new term was coined, 
namely biocultural diversity, and a book edited by Luisa Maffi, entitled On Biocultural 
Diversity: Linking Language, Knowledge, and the Environment was released, also in 2001. It 
contains a series of articles highlighting various aspects of biological, cultural and linguistic 
diversity, along with perceived interconnections and threats to them all. Maffi, who co-
founded the Terralingua organisation, has defined biocultural diversity as: "the diversity of 
life in all its manifestations: biological, cultural, and linguistic — which are interrelated (and 
possibly coevolved) within a complex socio-ecological adaptive system” (Pretty. J et al, p. 
269). It is worth noting here that “cultural” and “linguistic” are noted separately. Indeed, the 
Terralingua publication Biocultural Diversity Toolkit: An Introduction to Biocultural 
Diversity, contains a section on the three manifestations of biocultural diversity. Biodiversity 
and linguistic diversity are represented by species and languages respectively, but cultural 
diversity is described as “the variety of worldviews, lifeways, knowledge and value systems, 




appear to be a reasonable enough approximation of a definition; however, the following point 
is also made: 
How many different cultures there are in the world is difficult to quantify, 
because cultural boundaries are permeable, and many cultural traits overlap 
across multiple social groups. Due to these complexities, commonly the number 
of different languages is used as a proxy for the diversity of cultures (ibid).  
This can immediately be seen as a contradiction. If languages are sufficiently close to 
cultures to serve as a proxy, then there are only two manifestations of biocultural diversity. 
Conversely, if they are not close enough for that purpose, then languages should not be used 
as a proxy for cultures in the first place. The fundamental point behind biocultural diversity, 
however, is that the “three realms” (p. 2) of the web of life are interwoven and 
interdependent, as illustrated in the figure below:   
Figure 4:  Plant diversity versus language diversity
 
Figure 4 shows the Terralingua map of plant diversity (shades of green) and language 
diversity (black dots). The darker the shade of green, the greater the diversity of plants, and 
the more numerous the black dots, the greater the diversity of languages (Biocultural 
Diversity Toolkit: Vol 1: An Introduction to Biocultural Diversity, p.11. Source: Stepp et al 




This, then, offers another parallel between biological species and languages in an ecological 
context, often utilised by those on all sides. For instance, the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the body which produces the Red List of Threatened 
Species, made this statement about biocultural diversity, where, once again, we see language 
being used as standard bearer for cultural diversity, as if the one represented the other:  
It is no coincidence that areas of linguistic and ethnic diversity are also areas rich 
in biodiversity. Most of the world’s languages are spoken by indigenous and 
other tribal peoples in countries that harbour great biodiversity. When a language 
dies, we also stand to lose the local ecological knowledge and wisdom that 
reposes in that language (IUCN, 2018).  
 
In 2015, linguist Stig Eliasson, presented a paper in Language Sciences entitled ‘The 
birth of language ecology: interdisciplinary influence in Einar Haugen’s ‘The ecology of 
language’. In addition to Haugen’s own definition of language ecology as “the study of 
interactions between any given language and its environment” (p. 78) he references some of 
the more fundamental elements of Haugen’s concept such as that “the true environment of a 
language is the society that uses it” (p. 79) and that “language exists only in the minds of its 
users” (ibid). Eliasson, for his part, states his intention to “outline some of its conceptual and 
theoretical problems” (ibid). He notes that the term ecology (in any context) is not attested 
until the second half of the nineteenth century. In a specifically linguistic context, he 
distinguishes between, on the one hand, Haugen’s linguistic or language ecology, and, on the 
other, a field which has labelled itself ecolinguistics. There are significant differences 
between these, with the former representing language interaction and contact, and the latter 
defining itself thus:  
Ecolinguistics explores the role of language in the life-sustaining interactions of 
humans, other species and the physical environment. The first aim is to develop 
linguistic theories which see humans not only as part of society, but also as part 
of the larger ecosystems that life depends on. The second aim is to show how 
linguistics can be used to address key ecological issues, from climate change and 




Haugen is on record as stating in 1987 that “there were many parallels in the current concerns 
about plant and animal species to the linguists’ concerns about the life and death of 
languages” (p. 83). Eliasson notes that in Haugen’s (admittedly limited) ecological analogy, 
the three “central elements” (p. 86) of his framework are, organism, environment and 
interaction. According to him, “the difficulty that lies in the translation of biological and 
social conditions into linguistic ones, leads to a shifting focus in his definitions of language 
ecology, and its object of study is not well defined” (p. 90).  
In similar fashion, A.V. Kravchenko’s 2016 paper ‘Two views on language ecology 
and ecolinguistics’ criticises, not only Haugen’s core concept, here described as including 
“contradictory or mutually excluding theoretical approaches” but also linguistics more 
generally. Its treatment of language as a “tool” and languages as “codes” is referred to as “the 
language myth” (p. 108). With frustration reminiscent of Edward O. Wilson some forty years 
earlier he claims that: 
Biologically, a human is a linguistic organism…. Failure to realize that language 
is a biological phenomenon is, probably, one of the reasons why the millennia-
long study of language has not produced any remarkable effects on human life 
compared to the achievements in physics, chemistry, biology, or computer 
science (p. 102).  
 
To add to the disciplinary confusion, unlike the distinction referred to above, Kravchenko 
treats language ecology and ecolinguistics as basically interchangeable. There are therefore 
numerous conceptual and definitional difficulties associated with this field.  
 
1.3.4  Cultural evolution  
In 2005, the book Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution by 
Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd was published. This was the culmination of work started as 




gene-culture coevolutionary theory. The authors themselves note the two main points that 
they wish to make in the book, namely that;  
• culture is crucial for understanding human behaviour; 
• culture is part of biology.  
In keeping with several other authors mentioned above they bemoan the scant attention paid 
to evolutionary theory by many social scientists, believing that:  
the most fundamental questions of how humans came to be the kind of animal we are 
can only be answered by a theory in which culture has its proper role and in which it 
is intimately intertwined with other aspects of human biology (p. 4).  
 
They then, on page 5, offer the following definition of culture:  
“Culture is information capable of affecting individuals' behavior that they acquire from other 
members of their species through teaching, imitation and other forms of social transmission”.  
  This book is a serious attempt at bridging the gap between the natural and social 
sciences, and is a worthwhile venture for that reason alone. However, some essential 
questions remain regarding the above definition, such as, for example, why information 
acquired from other species, or from independent deduction via the non-human environment 
should be excluded? Within the book, language is clearly included under the umbrella term 
“culture” and is used on occasion to support their hypothesis (e.g. pp. 90-92). Here, they note 
that cultures are not tightly structured wholes, a point which is at odds with a well-established 
definition of culture, still prevalent in anthropology today, as “that complex whole which 
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor, 1871, p. 1). They also note that language is 
not a good predictor of material culture, that studies in diverse parts of the world have shown 




material culture than villages just as nearby which speak totally unrelated languages. To this 
they add that languages likewise do not correlate with other traditions in the form of hunting, 
farming, religion, dance and other rituals. Mixing people from different populations “may 
produce independent subcultures within a population, subcultures that can coexist within a 
single individual” (p. 93). Apart from confirming the fact that languages are not the same 
things as “cultures”, it also implies that there are so many variables to what people learn that, 
ultimately, we all have a culture of our own. This stance will be expressed later in this essay, 
although possibly not in a manner which is in full agreement with the authors.  
Another champion of cultural evolution is Alex Mesoudi, who, in 2011, published a 
book entitled Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human Culture and 
Synthesize the Social Sciences (Mesoudi, 2011). In it, Dawkins’ memetics is described as one 
of a number of “recent fads” (loc. 611) and the author notes the importance of defining 
“exactly what is meant by a theory of cultural evolution” (loc. 612). Variation, competition 
and inheritance are seen as essential components, as without all three “evolution simply does 
not happen” (loc. 634). The point of the book is to show that culture contains all the 
necessary elements for evolution to take place. Variation in culture is plain for all to see 
through the different sets of skills and beliefs in evidence across the world. The “struggle for 
life” (loc. 721) by the words and grammatical forms of languages is used as an example of 
competition, with the gradual accumulation of knowledge and technological advancement 
proving the existence of inheritance. In summary, it proposes that human culture evolves in a 
Darwinian manner (but not a neo-Darwinian one as per Dawkins). The following quote, 
however, appears on the face of it to be something of a contradiction:  
We can also observe cultural adaptations that are exquisitely designed for a 
particular purpose or for use in a particular environment but that are the result of 
cultural rather than biological evolution. An example might be the bow and 
arrow, which features multiple working parts all interacting with one another in a 




Exquisite designs for particular purposes are not the product of a “blind watchmaker”, but 
rather of a designer. Those arguing the case for cultural evolution, however, seem to be 
unfazed by this point. Indeed, it is clearly made in the book: “cultural evolution appears to be 
guided by the intentional actions of people who possess at least some degree of foresight, 
potentially increasing the likelihood of adaptive cultural mutations” (loc. 1016-1018). Such 
intentional actions are known as “guided variation”, which is one of two types of cultural 
mutation, the other being “copying error”. Whereas copying error is directly analogous to 
genetic mutation, guided variation is a specifically cultural process that does not have a close 
parallel in biological evolution (Stubbersfield et al, 2018). This does not, of course, imply 
that guided variation is in any way false, but rather that there is no equivalent to it in the 
process after which cultural evolution has chosen to name itself. Its classification as an 
evolutionary feature should therefore be handled with care, as the fact that human beings 
advance technologically does not of itself make that process evolutionary by default.  
Perhaps of more direct relevance, however, is the extent to which guided intentional 
actions reflect the ways in which languages change. In 2013, the chapter “Cultural Evolution 
of Language” was co-written by Dan Dediu and ten other eminent linguists. Contrary to the 
stance taken by Pinker, Chomsky and others, this piece argues against treating language as an 
“instinct” and is critical of “the misconception of language particularism” (p. 304), which 
treats language as if it were different from other kinds of human culture. Many of these 
misconceptions about language are soundly rebutted, although it is not apparent why any of 
the rebuttals in themselves mean that language should not be treated separately from other 
kinds of culture. Language itself is seen as a form of “coordinative technology” (p. 310) 
where speakers “agree” (ibid) on a joint code. “Agree” implies conscious consent, and is at 
odds with the authors’ own conclusion that languages “offer us elaborate design without any 




332). This last statement, perhaps unintentionally, conjures up an image of language 
evolution which contradicts Mesoudi’s “intentional actions” and also the article’s own 
criticism of “language particularism”. The arguments made for cultural evolution as a whole 
can easily come across as attempts at trying to fit a square peg into a round hole, with 
proponents eager to find a mechanism which will synthesise the social sciences. Language 
taken separately, on the other hand, has no problem passing Mesoudi’s three tests with flying 
colours. The example of competition has already been noted, and the very existence of 6,500 
languages, and their gradual changing over time (e.g. Old, Middle and Modern Welsh) 
clearly prove variation and inheritance. This does not necessarily mean that there is a conflict 
between the two, however, as it may be that the different components of culture all evolve, 
but, as is the case with biological reproduction for example, do not do so in the same way. In 
his 2018 article, “What is cultural evolution like?”, Daniel Nettle opines that “the real 
problem for the hope of a unified Darwinian “cultural evolutionary theory” is that different 
cultural cases are very different from one another, and hence approximate the genetic 
situation to different degrees” (p. 62). The examples illustrated above hopefully show that 
language and technology sit at two very different ends of this cultural evolutionary scale. 
Nettle goes on to question a vision of culture which largely sees people as passive recipients 
of it, stating that he, in the main, has “interests and biases that go beyond the mere desire for 
my behaviour to be the same as everyone else’s” (p. 74), and argues for a unity of the social 
sciences which places “human action, or more generally human cognition, rather than cultural 







2.  Methods 
Following successful completion of the relevant institutional ethical approval procedures, 
research activity commenced. In keeping with the Themes of the project as noted in 1.2 
above, relevant publications were sought, in the form of published books, articles in academic 
journals and web pages, which dealt with the following topics:  
• The relationship between language and animal communication; 
• Parallels between historical linguistics and evolutionary biology; 
• Parallels between linguistic and biological ecology;  
• The relationship of culture to both language and biology.  
As far as animal communication, historical linguistics and linguistic ecology were concerned, 
it was decided at an early stage that research questions related to these would benefit from 
asking the experts in person. To that end, three distinct, but similarly themed questionnaires 
were produced, each containing a mixture of multiple-choice and open questions, some of 
which were common to all three. The option of producing one generic questionnaire for all 
disciplines was considered but ruled out, as some specific questions were deemed necessary 
in each case, and these may possibly have led to confusion amongst the other recipients. 
Subsequently, the questionnaire on animal communication contained 14 questions, while 
those on historical linguistics and linguistic ecology both contained 12.  
Searches were carried out for authors who had been published in these three areas, 
and this aspect was considered more important than whether or not the author in question was 
acknowledged as an historical linguist, linguistic ecologist and so on. All views were 
welcome, provided they had gone through the quality assurance procedures required for 
publication, especially in academic journals. Consequently, some of those academics writing 
on, for example, language change, may have been considered, or considered themselves, to 




the determining factor. As many of them were in any case leading academics in their given 
disciplines, it was envisaged that they would be extremely busy people who may well not be 
able to respond to a questionnaire from a research student. Consequently, a total of 60 emails, 
20 in each of the three fields, were sent individually to each recipient in the hope that perhaps 
20 responses overall would be returned. In line with expectations, just under one in three of 
the recipients completed the questionnaire, four from animal communication, six from 
historical linguistics and nine from linguistic ecology. Questionnaires were distributed via 
email, but all emails were sent using a university email address so that recipients were able to 
see that the message had been sent from an academic institution. An introductory letter was 
included, outlining the project, and the right of recipients to not participate at all or withdraw 
at any point. Personal information on participants was kept in password-protected files.  
All recipients were asked in the initial questionnaires whether they would be willing 
to participate further in a semi-structured interview, and of the 19 respondents, six went on to 
undertake this second part of the process, three in historical linguistics and three in linguistic 
ecology. Unfortunately, no-one from the animal communication side proceeded to this stage. 
The one animal communication specialist who had initially agreed to an interview, which led 
to a series of detailed questions based on that individual’s publications being prepared, 
suddenly decided to withdraw. No reason was given. However, by this point, it was too late 
to look for someone else. A summary of the final figures can be seen in the table below:  
Table 4: Specialist questionnaires 
Questionnaire type  Invitations  Responses  Interviews   
Animal communication 20 4 0 
Historical linguistics  20 6 3 
Linguistic ecology  20 9 3 




Responses to the first generic questionnaire were anonymous, and, for most 
contributors, their participation ended at this point. An outline of the questions is shown 
below in this section, with the actual questions and responses shown in Section 3. The semi-
structured interviews, on the other hand, contained bespoke questions based on the individual 
respondents’ replies to the first questionnaire, and also on their published work. 
Consequently, before moving from the first to the second stage, and given that identification 
of the individuals concerned would be virtually inevitable under these circumstances in any 
event, respondents were asked for permission to include their names. Despite the original 
intention to hold video-link or face-to-face interviews, this proved difficult in practice, and so 
the interviewees returned their completed answers in writing, in their own time.  
The biocultural diversity questionnaire aimed at the general public, which forms, in 
essence a sub-section of Theme 3, was dealt with in a different manner. As this is a topic 
which regularly receives considerable media attention, at least in the case of biodiversity, a 
questionnaire was prepared which could be sent to members of the general public to assess 
not only their factual knowledge of different biocultural categories, but also their attitudes 
towards them. The original intention was for this to be split between recipients based in the 
largely monolingual UK and another nation-state with a high proportion of multilinguals, 
such as the Netherlands, in order to establish whether or not the ability to speak more than 
one language had any bearing on the answers. However, after initial enquiries, this route 
turned out to be prohibitively expensive. For practical reasons, the questionnaire was 
subsequently distributed to students and staff in one of the Faculties at the University of 
Wales Trinity Saint David, as there was no reason to assume that this group would be any 
more knowledgeable than any other non-specialist group. The aim was to receive 100 
responses, and a total of 105 were completed, this time via an online survey platform rather 




questions on biodiversity, linguistic diversity and cultural diversity at random intervals. One 
reason for doing this was to assess whether knowledge of, or attitudes towards, biodiversity 
would be any stronger than the others.  
With regard, then, to the fourth theme on the relationship of culture to both species 
and languages, it was deemed sufficient to rely solely on available materials in published 
academic works, and incorporate questions about the divide between the natural sciences on 
the one hand, and the humanities and social sciences on the other, into various questions in 
the different questionnaires. This theme was based upon the issue raised in 1959 by C.P. 
Snow for the annual Rede Lecture at the University of Cambridge entitled The Two Cultures. 
Snow was, in his own words, “by training…a scientist; by vocation…a writer” (p. 1) and 
therefore ideally placed to comment on this divide. Members of these two groups had, 
according to Snow, “almost ceased to communicate at all” (ibid) to such an extent that “the 
intellectual life of the whole of western society is increasingly being split into two polar 
groups” (p. 2) labelled by him as literary intellectuals and scientists. He bemoans a “fanatical 
belief in educational specialisation” (p. 9) particularly in the UK, and asserts that the gap 
between scientists and non-scientists “is much less bridgeable among the young than it was 
even thirty years ago” (ibid). Given that the biological and the linguistic landed on different 
sides of this gap, it was felt that this topic may be of some significance.  
 
2.1  Animal communication questionnaire for published authors   
The introductory paragraph of this questionnaire noted that its purpose was to gather 
information to help establish the extent to which academics studying aspects of animal 
communication use theories and methods from linguistics in their research, and where animal 
communication sits as a discipline. This is in accordance with the first theme outlined in the 




in Europe, North America and Asia who had published on the topic, and the four responses 
received were from the United States (2), France and the Netherlands. Questions 1 and 2 
related to whether or not recipients considered animal communication to be a branch of some 
other discipline and how they saw themselves as individual academics. The underlying 
reason for these questions was to establish whether linguistics/linguist would feature amongst 
the responses, given that human language is itself a form of animal communication. Question 
3 asked for information on personal research undertaken by the participants, while Questions 
4 to 10 were all linked in some way to either the necessity, desirability or reality of 
collaboration between animal communication and linguistics. Question 11, related to the 
“two cultures” theme, asked whether the division of academic disciplines into natural and 
social sciences facilitated or inhibited collaboration across this divide. In keeping with the 
centrality of this theme, this question was asked in all three of the questionnaires. Questions 
12 and 13 pertained specifically to differences and similarities in inter- and intraspecies 
communication, and offer an example of why separate questionnaires were provided for each 
target audience. The final question was a request for a semi-structured interview, which was 
also common to all three questionnaires.  
 
2.2  Historical linguistics questionnaire for published authors   
The introductory sentence of this questionnaire noted that its purpose was to gather 
information to help shed further light on the shared terms and concepts used in (evolutionary) 
biology and (historical) linguistics. This can therefore be seen to be in keeping with the 
second of this essay’s four themes. Individual emails were sent to academic staff in Europe, 
North America and Australasia who had published on the topic, and the six responses 
received were (one each) from the United States, Portugal, Germany, the United Kingdom, 




first, with the first four questions all concentrating on aspects of common terminology such 
as “vulnerable”, “extinct” and “genetically related” and attitudes towards them. Questions 5 
to 8, were all linked in some way to either the necessity, desirability or reality of 
collaboration between evolutionary biology and historical linguistics, with Question 9 being 
the same “two cultures” question as the one in the animal communication questionnaire. 
Questions 10 and 11 were subject-specific, focusing on the shared usage of “family trees” 
and definitions of the term “evolution” with regard to languages. This latter question was 
therefore linked not only to Theme 2, but also to the fourth theme of this dissertation on the 
relationship between language, culture and biology. The final question once again asked 
whether respondents would be available for a semi-structured interview.  
 
2.3  Linguistic ecology questionnaire for published authors   
This questionnaire noted that its purpose was to gather information to help shed 
further light on the shared terms and concepts used in linguistic and biological ecology. This 
can therefore be seen to be in keeping with Theme 3 of this essay’s four themes. Individual 
emails were sent to academic staff in Europe, Asia, North America, South America and 
Australasia who had published on the topic, and the nine responses received were from the 
United States (3), Germany (2), Brazil, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Australia. This 
questionnaire followed a rather similar format to the second, but was based upon shared 
concepts in an ecological, as opposed to an evolutionary context. For example, recipients of 
this questionnaire were asked for their views on the use of the term “ecology” in a linguistic 
context rather than a question on “family trees”. All the other questions were either identical 
or else “ecological” equivalents to the “evolutionary” ones in the historical linguistics 
questionnaire. In general, and to a greater extent than was the case with the other 




as well as, and sometimes instead of, choosing from the options provided. One noticeable 
feature was that there were considerably more opinions about fundamental issues such as the 
nature and scope of the field. These were often contradictory or critical in nature and gave the 
impression that this field is divided, if it is in fact one field in the first place.  
 
2.4 Biocultural diversity questionnaire for the general public   
The purpose behind this questionnaire was to examine the third theme of parallels 
between linguistic and biological ecology from a different angle, namely that of the general 
public as opposed to published academics. Its aim was to catch a glimpse of a lay audience’s 
awareness of the scale of both biological and cultural diversity globally, the perceived threats 
to these, and consequent attitudes towards their preservation.  
The 16 questions were placed into three sub-categories, namely:  
• How many?  
• What percentage?  
• How important?  
The first two are of course quantifiable, while the last measures attitudes. Questions on 
languages and cultural heritage were deliberately interspersed between those on biodiversity 
in an attempt to avoid any second guessing as to the direction of travel. Establishing whether 
or not there was any difference in knowledge or attitudes between the “bio” and “cultural” 
sides of biocultural diversity was also an objective. Within the biological categories, the 
classes Mammalia and Amphibia were intentionally chosen to see whether lumpy toads 
elicited the same response as fluffy bunnies. Conifers were similarly selected to look for any 





3. Results of questionnaires and interviews  
The results of the questionnaires have been divided below into those questions which 
are specific to individual questionnaires and those which are shared between two or more. 
The results of all questions can be seen in the following sections, with, where applicable, the 
options presented and the number of received responses indicated in each case. A selection of 
the most significant additional comments has also been included. When compiling the 
responses, it became apparent that the collation of information would have been improved 
had each questionnaire contained one section of common questions and another section of 
specific ones, thus making it easier to standardise the numbering of questions. This had not 
been done initially as the questionnaires were prepared individually and then distributed as 
soon as completed, however, this oversight would not be repeated in any future distribution. 
On this occasion, those questions which were included in more than one questionnaire have 
been placed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 with their combined results shown in Tables 12 – 22. It 
should be noted that the letter “Q” at the beginning of a reference, e.g. QAC1, indicates a 
respondent’s questionnaire number, whereas “Q” at the end, e.g. ACQ1, indicates a question 
number within a particular questionnaire.    
 
3.1  Results of questions specific to the animal communication questionnaire  
Unfortunately, only four responses were received in the field of animal 
communication. All will remain anonymous as none went on to complete a semi-structured 
interview. That said, every respondent was a leading expert in this line of work, regularly 
publishing the results of research in scientific journals. This alone has made their responses 
of great use. The first question (ACQ1) related to the status of animal communication and 





 Table 5: Responses to ACQ1: “Do you consider the study of animal communication to 
be a branch of any of the following academic disciplines? (please highlight as many as 
you feel relevant)”  
Option Responses 
a) Biology   4 
b) Zoology  3 
c) Ecology  1 
d) Ethology  4 
e) Behavioural science  2 
f) Cognitive science  3 
g) Psychology    1 
h) Linguistics  1 
i) Other (please specify)  0 
 
The second question (ACQ2), based on the same choice of academic disciplines, was directed 
at the individual respondents themselves:  
Table 6: Responses to ACQ2: “Do you consider yourself to be any of the following? 
(please highlight as many as you feel relevant)”  
Option Responses 
a) Biologist   2 
b) Zoologist 2 
c) Ecologist 1 
d) Ethologist  3 




f) Cognitive scientist  1 
g) Psychologist   2 
h) Linguist 0 
i) Other (please specify)  0 
 
It is significant, then, that of all the choices offered, linguist was the only option 
which received no responses at all. When combining the results of these first two questions, it 
can be seen that ethology/ethologist is at the top of the league with seven, and linguistics/ 
linguist at the bottom with zero. Ironically, the responses given to ACQ3 would grace many a 
linguistics department. The question asked was “Could you explain in simple terms which 
aspects of animal communication have primarily featured in any research you have 
undertaken”. The responses included “the structure and function of signals, including the 
mechanisms by which they were produced” (QAC1), “perception and categorization of 
human speech prosody” (QAC2), “language evolution; bio-acoustics; eco-acoustics; 
articulation; semantics; syntax; socio-ecology” (QAC3) and “the social functions of more 
complex forms (enhanced repertoire size) of communication” (QAC4). The responses to 
ACQ4, namely “Does the study of animal communication in general have its own specific 
methods which are distinct from other disciplines?” suggests some difference of opinion 
ranging, on the one hand, from the bluntly put “no” (QAC3) and “I don’t think so, studying 
animal communication is inherently multidisciplinary.…” (QAC1) to, on the other hand, “I 
think so, especially considering the different modalities of communication among the animal 
kingdom, and the specific constraints of every animal species” (QAC2) and “acoustic data 
collection and playback experiments are relatively unique to animal communication. These 




Regarding whether or not the study of animal communication should include human language 
(ACQ5), there would appear to be strong, albeit conditional, support for this idea amongst the 
respondents, as illustrated below.  
Table 7: Responses to ACQ5: “In your opinion, should human language fall within the 
scope of animal communication?”  
Option Responses 
a) Yes, in principle, but due to its ubiquity and complexity, human language 
would still require a specific discipline of its own  
3 
b) No, its inclusion would detract from the study of other animal species  0 
c) Partially, the study of human language should be seen as a ‘sister’ but 
separate discipline 
1 
d) Other 0 
  
No additional comments were added. Nevertheless, the fact that none of the participants 
selected Option b) would seem to justify the question being asked.  
 
In response to the question “Does any aspect of your specific personal research 
involve collaboration with linguists?” (ACQ8), this was noted as being the case by all four, 
with comments including “not at present, but it has on occasion in the past and will likely 
require more such collaboration in the future” (QAC1), and “yes, establishing and 
development of speech rhythmic and intonational patterns for testing prosody perception” 
(QAC2), to a simple “yes” (QAC3) and “yes some of my work has been in collaborative with 
researchers from quantitative linguistics” (QAC4). With regard to similarities in 
communication systems across different animal species (ACQ12), all of the options offered 




Table 8: Responses to ACQ12: “to the best of your knowledge, does research in animal 
communication suggest that similarities across different animal species are primarily 
driven by: (please highlight as many as you feel relevant)” 
Option Responses 
a) Shared evolutionary inheritance (taxonomic genus/class etc)  3 
b) Shared environmental factors (e.g. ‘social’ structures and living patterns)  3 
c) Geographical proximity  1 
d) Other?   0 
 
Additional comments noted that “for any pair of species, the reasons will be different” 
(QAC3) and that “there is evidence for all of these options” (QAC4).  
 
In similar fashion, responses to ACQ13, on intraspecific dialect or accents, noted that all of 
the proposed options could apply in different circumstances:  
Table 9: Responses to ACQ13: “To the best of your knowledge, does research in animal 
communication suggest that different ‘dialects’ or ‘accents’ found within the same 
individual species are primarily: (please highlight as many as you feel relevant)” 
Option Responses 
a) Inherited through the genes 2 
b) The result of learned behaviour 2 
c) The result of geographical separation  0 
d) Other?   1 
 
It was emphasised that “both types of variation can be either innate or learned” (QAC3). 




source of learned variation, given that “in some cases, such as birdsong, learning is clearly 
the primary source of dialect differences.  In other cases, there may be a mix and in yet other 
cases, genetic differences are the most parsimonious explanation” (QAC1). Nevertheless, the 
assertion that “bird song dialect is often thought to be learned, whereas variation in primate 
vocalizations is typically thought to be innate” (QAC4) did come as something of a surprise.   
 
3.2  Results of questions specific to the historical linguistics questionnaire  
A total of six questionnaires were completed on the links between evolutionary 
biology and historical linguistics. Only one of the questions (BLQ10), was specific to this 
questionnaire, and the response to it can be seen in the table below.  
Table 10: Responses to BLQ10: “In your opinion, is the ‘family tree’ model of 
indicating evolutionary relationships (please highlight as many as you feel relevant)”  
Option  Responses 
a) An adequate model for all biological species 2 
b) An adequate model for all languages 2 
c) An adequate model for some biological species, but not all 1 
d) An adequate model for some languages, but not all 2 
e) An inadequate model for biological species 4 
f) An inadequate model for languages 3  
g) Other? 0 
 
As one of the staples of phylogenetic relationships, whether biological or linguistic, the 
family tree model, famously used by Darwin for his “tree of life” diagram and also used in 
philology to explain relationships between languages, clearly turned out to be a thorny issue. 




with two offering combinations of both adequate and inadequate, one stressing that it was 
“much more appropriate for biology” (QBLE6) and the other claiming that “in both biology 
and language, some patterns of diversification are tree-like but some aren't” (QBLE3).  
 
3.3 Results of questions specific to the linguistic ecology questionnaire  
A total of nine respondents completed the questionnaire on linguistic ecology. Again, 
only one of the questions (ELQ1) was specific to this questionnaire alone, and that question, 
along with responses to it, are shown here:  
Table 11: Responses to ELQ1: “The term ‘ecology’ is often used to describe interactions 
between not only biological organisms but also languages in their respective 
environments. Do you consider the application of the same term for these different 
phenomena to be:”  
Option Responses 
a) Of no consequence, both concepts are easily understood and separated  1 
b) Useful and of some significance, indicating the similar processes affecting 
both biodiversity and linguistic diversity 
3 
c) Unhelpful and misleading, giving the impression that languages are living 
organisms  
3 
d) Other?  1 
 
The “other” response above added that this application of the same terms was “very useful” 
(QEL5) and so was closest to Option b). It can be seen that the number of responses above 
totals only eight. This is because one respondent chose to expand on the questions asked 
rather than select one of the multiple-choice options, stating that “the notion of “ecology” is 




This was one of many additional responses received to this question, with a diverse range of 
opinions in evidence. The quotes below offer some indication of these. One opinion 
expressed was that:  
the term “language ecology” is confusing to biologists, natural scientists in 
general and laymen informed about biology. I would have preferred a different, 
distinct term for the matters pursued (QEL9). 
 
A similar objection, albeit from a different viewpoint, but with its own suggested alternative, 
stated that: 
it is anthropocentric to use the term “ecology” in a way that excludes animals, 
plants, forests, rivers and trees at a time in history that we most need to focus on 
them. So I would much prefer it if “language ecology” was instead referred to as 
“language interaction” (QEL2). 
 
Yet another respondent, however, emphasised the point that not only the linguistic, but also 
the biological use of the term “ecology” is based upon a metaphor, and that:  
the question should not be whether biology and linguistics can be kept apart but 
whether researchers in biology and linguistics alike are aware of the metaphorical 
nature of the term and the consequences of using it (QEL6). 
 
This could perhaps be considered a reminder to those who believe that “ecology” is solely a 
biological term. As if to reinforce this, a further respondent noted that: 
the term itself seems to be applied to mean two very different things: 1) the 
relationship between languages within a given social/ political context, and 2) the 
relationship between languages and the physical environment. There is basically 
disagreement about what constitutes the environment – is it social/political or 
physical/biological? (QEL4). 
 
This comment highlights the divisions referred to previously. The killer blow, however, was 
the following:  
so far in my reading of Ecolinguistics I have yet to come across a convincing 
paper on the topic, so I have yet to understand what “ecology” applied to a 






3.4 Results of questions common to the historical linguistics and linguistic ecology 
questionnaires  
Five questions were common to both the historical linguistics and the linguistic 
ecology questionnaires. This combination means that the total number of respondents now 
increases to fifteen, although one respondent in particular (QEL3) chose to write in the 
additional comments boxes rather than selecting from the multiple-choice options. The 
responses to these five questions are shown in this section, with the first here:  
Table 12: Responses to BLQ1/ELQ2: “The terms ‘vulnerable’, ‘critically endangered’ 
and ‘extinct’ are used to classify levels of endangerment not only of biological species 
(IUCN) but also of languages (UNESCO). Do you consider the application of the same 
terms for these different phenomena to be:” 
Option Responses 
a) Of no consequence, both are easily understood and separated 2 
b) Of use and of some significance, indicating the similar dangers facing both 
biodiversity and linguistic diversity 
10 
c) Unhelpful and misleading, giving the impression that languages are living 
organisms 
2 
d) Other? 0    
 
It can be seen that Option b) was clearly the most popular choice, with Option a) receiving 
two responses on the historical linguistics questionnaire but none on the linguistic ecology 
one, and Option c) doing the reverse. The sharing of terms in fact seemed to face greater 
opposition within the linguistic ecology/ecolinguistics field than it did elsewhere. That said, 




ecology”, with two respondents keen to make this point themselves in their additional 
comments.  
One of these was as follows:  
I view the terms “vulnerable”, “critically endangered” and “extinct” as more 
neutral than the term “language ecology”. The former terms do not necessarily 
make you think of biological organisms (QEL9). 
 
The other displayed much the same sentiment: 
These terms generally make sense and don’t imply that languages behave like 
species in general (in the way that “language ecology” does) (QEL2). 
 
Some responses, however, came with an added warning:  
It is of significance and also of (some) use. But there is a theory behind it, 
equalling some aspects of languages with some aspects of living beings. This 
theory makes sense from one point of view, but is terribly misleading from 
another (QEL6). 
 
Also, from a rather different angle:   
I think these labels are misleading because endangerment isn’t a property of a 
language. It’s the product of a political context – we should be rating that. 
Labelling languages “endangered” etc verges on victim blaming (QEL4). 
 
This last point, although valid, is nevertheless equally true for biological species. 
Endangerment is not a property of theirs either, and political policy will also determine vital 
aspects of their conservation such as habitat loss or (in)action on climate change.  
 
The next question was based on the same principle, but with a different choice of 
terms. Here is the question and the responses to it: 
Table 13: Responses to BLQ2/ELQ3: “Terms such as ‘living’, ‘dead’ and ‘genetically 
related’ are frequently used to describe languages. Do you consider the application of 







a) Of no consequence, their meaning is easily understood 2 
b) Of use and of some significance, indicating similarities in the ways that 
both biological species and languages come into being, cease to exist and 
relate to each other 
6 
c) Unhelpful and misleading, given that languages are neither living 
organisms nor related to each other by genes 
3 
d) Other? 3 
 
There were again some differences between the historical linguistics questionnaire responses 
and the linguistic ecology ones, with Option a) chosen only by the former, and Option d) 
solely by the latter. The use of “genetically related” in particular seemed to arouse strong 
feelings, as indicated here:  
“genetically related” may be misleading since it implies too strongly that 
languages behave in the same way as species, which might blind researchers to 
ways that they might be different (QEL2). 
 
And even more strongly here:  
 
Especially the term “genetically related” is gravely misleading and should be 
replaced. The other two terms are, however, less innocuous and so well 
entrenched that they will have to be kept (QEL9).  
 
Again, as far as the following question on biocultural diversity was concerned, as 
shown in Table 14 below, it is interesting to note that all three of the respondents who chose 
Option b) were recipients of the historical linguistics questionnaire. It was not chosen by any 
of the linguistic ecology respondents, who, it could be argued, should have a better 





Table 14: Responses to BLQ3/ELQ4: “The term ‘biocultural diversity’ has been defined 
as “the diversity of life in all its manifestations: biological, cultural, and linguistic”. All 
three types of diversity are often noted as facing similar threats. Do you consider these 
common threats to be”:  
Option Responses 
a) Clearly linked, there is a knock-on effect between all three 6 
b) Environmentally determined. Biological, cultural and linguistic diversity 
are similar in certain areas simply because they share the same kind of biome 
(e.g. dense rainforest versus arctic tundra) 
3 
c) Entirely coincidental, they are not interrelated 0 
d) Other? 6 
 
In general, this question had a greater incidence of additional comments, ranging from 
“I am agnostic with respect to this question” (QBLE1) to the subtly put “I think these are 
consequences of complex phenomena that cannot be captured by the choices here provided” 
(QBLE4). It might simply be, therefore, that this question was too simplistic and not 
sufficiently thought through. One respondent felt that even if they were all linked that this 
was “of little practical value” (QEL4) and yet another that any links between them were 
primarily metaphorical (QEL6). The remaining comment, however, was straight and to the 
point: 
I think the notions “biological diversity” and “cultural and/or linguistic diversity” 
should be kept apart. For instance, “biological diversity” could in principle be 
maintained, while “linguistic diversity” totally disappears (QEL9).  
 
Despite some support, the suggestion that binomial nomenclature could be applied to 
languages in a similar fashion to biological species was not well received, with the largest 




create a standard method of labelling languages by linguists which would be independent of 
political considerations. The responses are shown below.   
Table 15: Responses to BLQ4/ELQ6: “Binomial nomenclature (e.g. Canis lupus) is 
applied to biological species, often alongside a common name (e.g. wolf). In your 
opinion, would the application of binomial nomenclature to the world’s languages in 
similar fashion be:” 
Option Responses 
a) Of no practical purpose 7 
b) A useful means of distinguishing languages from each other, especially in 
the more linguistically diverse parts of the world 
3 
c) Another example of blurring the distinction between biological organisms 
and languages 
1 
d) Other? 3 
 
Whether or not the evolution/ecology of languages was part of a wider cultural or 
biological process received a mixed response, as follows:  
Table 16: Responses to BLQ11/ELQ5: “In your opinion, which of the following 
definitions best explains the term ‘evolution’ / ‘ecology’ as applied to languages” 
Option Responses 
a) An exclusive process which applies to languages alone 1 
b) Part of the wider process of cultural evolution/ecology which includes 
other aspects of culture but is separate from biological evolution/ecology 
5 
c) Part of the wider process of biological evolution/ecology as are other forms 
of animal communication/human culture 
6 




One respondent claimed that “the question seems ill-stated” (QBLE1) and a further two wrote 
additional comments in the “other” box, as expressed here:  
The ecology of a language is not limited to the other languages that it coexists 
and may compete with. It includes a host of socioeconomic and natural ecology 
pressures that affect the behaviors of speakers (QEL3). 
 
And again here:  
Ecology is the interaction of humans with other humans, other species and the 
physical environment. Language use plays a role within ecology since it is one of 
the ways that humans interact with each other (QEL2).    
 
These seem in principle to be quite close to Option c), and it is apparent that language 
operating in a “vacuum” is not a popular view overall.  
 
3.5 Results of questions common to all three questionnaires  
A further five questions were common to all three questionnaires. This combination 
means that the total number of respondents now increases to nineteen, although, as previously 
mentioned, one of these (QEL3) usually chose to write in the additional comments boxes 
rather than selecting from the multiple-choice options and so this may affect the totals shown. 
It should be added that the animal communication version of the question shown in Table 17 
below was worded slightly differently to the other two, although it asked about the same issue 
in principle. Consequently, the respondents’ replies to the animal communication question 
have been placed against one of the available options based upon the wording of their 
responses. They can, however, be seen to be broadly in line with the others in any event. This 
scenario, however, was not the case with the remaining four questions, all of which, apart 
from naming the individual disciplines differently (e.g. animal communication/historical 
linguistics/ linguistic ecology) were identically structured. The responses to these five 




Table 17: Responses to BLQ5/ELQ7/ACQ6: “To the best of your knowledge, do (animal 
communication/evolutionary/ecological) biologists in general make use of findings from 
the field of (general/historical/ecological) linguistics?” 
Option Responses 
a) Regularly  0 
b) Often  1 
c) Sometimes  1 
d) Rarely  6 
e) Only in very specific cases  4 
f) Never  3 
g) Other  4 
 
As can be seen, biologists making use of findings from linguistics was deemed to be 
an event which happened rarely, if at all. This appeared to be the opinion across all three 
disciplines as no discernible differences were evident between the various sets of responses. 
The animal communications respondents ranged from uncertainty in the one case (QAC2) to 
the more typical “only occasionally” (QAC4), “no, not usually” (QAC3) and “not as it is 
practiced by most researchers today” (QAC1). The historical linguistics stance was perhaps 
best summed up by the following additional comment: “I am not aware of much if any 
influence in the direction from historical linguistics to evolutionary biology” (QBLE3). 
Meanwhile, many of the linguistic ecology responses once again displayed bemusement at 
the use of the term itself and doubted that biologists would make use of works specifically 
labelled “linguistic ecology” (QEL2) or even know anything about the “ecology of language” 
(QEL3). One claimed that “biologists are usually quite puzzled” by the term (QAC9). This 




many academics to “stay in their tiny epistemological box throughout their entire career” 
(QEL8). Another response to the linguistic ecology questionnaire, however, reminded us that 
“the form of illustrating genealogical trees in biology was adopted from illustrations from 
linguistics” (QEL6). This may serve as a timely reminder to those who hold serious 
objections to the application of the term “genetically related” in the linguistic field (see Table 
13 above). The reverse scenario, where linguists made use of findings from biology, appeared 
to be more evenly split, as can be seen here: 
Table 18: Responses to BLQ8/ELQ10/ACQ9: “To the best of your knowledge, do 
(historical/ecological) linguists in general make use of findings from the field of (animal 
communication/evolutionary/ecological) biology?” 
Option Responses 
a) Regularly  0 
b) Often  1 
c) Sometimes  7 
d) Rarely  6 
e) Only in very specific cases  3 
f) Never  0 
g) Other  1 
 
Five of the seven “sometimes” responses, however, came from the historical linguistics 
questionnaire, suggesting that this field makes greater use of biological methods than the 
others. Linguists using findings from animal communication specifically was not thought to 
be a regular occurrence, with one respondent making an additional comment which deserves 





I think biologists interested in animal communication are more likely to make use 
of findings from linguistics than are linguists interested in human language likely 
to make use of findings from those studying animal communication. Further (and 
perhaps unfortunately), I think linguists who do draw on findings from studies of 
animal communication sometimes “cherry pick” ideas and results and therefore 
draw on those studies in a shallow fashion (QAC1). 
 
One striking aspect of the linguistic ecology questionnaire was the additional comments, 
many of which were critical in some way. Two respondents, for example, again expressed 
uncertainty regarding the definition of a linguistic ecologist, and who might count as one. A 
range of different and conflicting attitudes towards “ecological linguistics” were then evident 
in several of the added comments:  
From dismissiveness:  
I think that they may borrow terminology from biological ecology (e.g., semantic 
niche) and then (in an often forced way) try to apply it to language (QEL2). 
 
To dislike:  
 
I think most “ecolinguists” as they call themselves (and I hate the term 
ecolinguistics!) are much influenced by environmentalists but have expressed 
little interest in macroecology. So their discourse is more moralizing than it can 
explain what is happening from an evolutionary perspective (QEL3). 
 
To disappointment:  
 
I have a degree in ecology and am surprised by how little use is actually made of 
ecological theory in ecological linguistics. There are so many concepts that could 
be deployed productively (QEL4). 
 
Despite the perceptions about the state of cross-fertilisation between biology and 
linguistics in general, the interdisciplinarity undertaken by respondents to the questionnaires 







Table 19: Responses to BLQ7/ELQ9/ACQ10: “Do you use methods from both 
(biological discipline) and (linguistic discipline) in your personal research?” 
Option Responses 
a) Regularly  6 
b) Often  3 
c) Sometimes  3 
d) Rarely  2 
e) Only in very specific cases  3 
f) Never  2 
g) Other  0 
 
One respondent even noted that:  
Linguists complain that I am too biologically oriented, while some biologists like 
what I do. But I really don’t know whether I should say I use “methods from 
biological … ecology.” (QEL3).  
 
As far as the desirability of collaborative research was concerned, it received replies 
which appear on the face of it to tell a different story to the reality on the ground. There is no 
discernible difference between the responses given across the three questionnaires, which is 
rather surprising given the differences in attitude seen in some of the previous responses. 









Table 20: Responses BLQ6/ELQ8/ACQ7: “In your opinion, is collaborative research 
between (biological discipline) and (linguistic discipline)” 
Option Responses 
a) Unnecessary   1 
b) Desirable  8 
c) Essential  8 
d) Other?    3 
 
Some responses contained quite detailed additional comments which have been included here 
for information. The one below was added by one of the historical linguistics respondents, 
who had also highlighted both the “desirable” and “essential” options:  
What is most essential, in my opinion, is recognizing that there is an abstract 
theory of evolutionary change (change by replication) that subsumes biological 
evolution, cultural evolution and language change. There are differences in how it 
is instantiated in these domains, and these differences can cause (and have 
caused) misinterpretations and mis-adaptations of ideas. There has to be some 
recognition of these facts on the part of both the biologists and the linguists who 
are collaborating, for it to be productive (QBLE3).  
 
The respondent who felt that any such collaboration was unnecessary added the following:  
If a “linguistic ecologist” only considers relationships of languages with other 
languages without considering the biological and physical world then it would be 
useless – the linguist could offer nothing to the ecologist. It would be much better 
for ecologists to meet ecolinguists (QEL2)  
 
This again appears to suggest a divide between one field (often, but not always, termed 
language ecology or linguistic ecology), which studies relationships between languages, such 
as, for example, language shift , and another (often, but not always, termed ecolinguistics), 
which studies languages from within a wider ecological framework, such as its role in 
sustaining human communities within their physical environment.  




if this theory sees a clear link between entity-like languages and biological 
entities, as it has been done so often since the 19th century, it is, I think, of no use, 
because there is, in my opinion, so much convincing evidence that the social and 
the biological do not work along the same lines (QEL6). 
 
There is an implication here that the “social” is therefore not “biological” and this distinction 
will be considered later. It in fact has some bearing on the next question regarding the 
division of academic subjects:   
Table 21: Responses to BLQ9/ELQ9/ACQ11: “In your opinion, does the division of 
academic disciplines into natural sciences on the one hand and social 
sciences/humanities on the other”: 
Option Responses 
a) Facilitate collaboration between biological and linguistic disciplines  
 
0 
b) Inhibit collaboration between biological and linguistic disciplines  
 
10 




d) Other?  3 
 
It can be seen that no-one was of the opinion that such a division facilitated collaboration 
between the two sides. This should occasion no surprise as division is not often a fruitful 
source for cooperation. Some additional comments were noted under the “other” option. One 
of these thought that merging natural and social sciences would cause problems of its own 
and that “changing the academic reward system to genuinely encourage interdisciplinary 
collaboration would be more helpful” (QBLE3). Another added that this academic division 




linguistics, while linguists often learn at least something about biology” (QBLE1). This 
should perhaps be compared to the comment made above by a biologist in response to the 
animal communication questionnaire (QAC1, Table 18) which says more or less the exact 
opposite. One respondent to the linguistic ecology questionnaire felt very strongly about this 
issue as can be seen by the following comment:  
This is one of the most pervasive problems within the academic institution. I have 
spent much of my career acting as if this division does not exist at all.  This is a 
form of reductionistic thinking that reduces knowledge to a little box (QEL8). 
 
The final question on each questionnaire was a request for an interview, which 
ultimately led to six being held. The number of responses to the different options are shown 
below:   
Table 22: Responses to BLQ12/ELQ12/ACQ14: “Would you be interested in 
participating in a brief semi-structured interview to expand on the subject matter raised 
in this questionnaire? (this would require permission to include your name)” 
Option  Responses 
a) Yes, of course 4 
b) No, unfortunately not 5 
c) Possibly, if a convenient time can be arranged 10 
 
3.6  Semi-structured Interviews from the Historical Linguistics Questionnaire   
Respondents were chosen for interview from those who had very kindly noted that they were 
definitely or possibly available. This required the tailoring of further bespoke questions based 
upon the answers to the initial questionnaire, as well as articles written by each individual 
contributor. The three interviews which resulted from the historical linguistics questionnaire 





3.6.1  Semi-structured Interview with Johann-Mattis List  
At the time of interview, Johann-Mattis List was Senior Scientist in the Department of 
Linguistic and Cultural Evolution at the Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human 
History in Jena, having previously worked as Research Fellow at the Centre de Recherches 
Linguistiques sur l’Asie Orientale in Paris, France, and as Post-Doctoral Researcher at 
Philipps University in Marburg, Germany. Doctor List has written extensively, either alone or 
in conjunction with other scholars, on the parallels between evolutionary biology and 
historical linguistics, and his main relevant works are referred to either in the following 
interview or in the bibliography. He was lead author of ‘Unity and disunity in evolutionary 
sciences: process-based analogies open common research avenues for biology and linguistics’ 
which was considered an essential article for this dissertation’s literature review. This 
interview is a continuation of responses given to the questionnaire QBLE1.  
When asked to elaborate on any collaborative work which has led to interdisciplinary 
progress between historical linguistics and evolutionary biology (SSIQ1JL), Doctor List 
referred to the upcoming article which he co-authored with Guillaume Jacques entitled ‘Save 
the trees. Why we need tree models in historical linguistics (and when we should apply 
them)’ (Jacques and List, 2019) which subsequently appeared in the Journal of Historical 
Linguistics 9.1, a special edition devoted to ‘Understanding language genealogy: Alternatives 
to the tree model’.  Jacques and List’s article basically defends the use of tree models to 
establish relationships between languages in historical linguistics, but notes in the conclusion 
that “no linguist would deny that not all aspects of language history are tree-like” (p. 158). 
This article, and, incidentally, this article alone, elicited a response in the same volume from 
the editors Kalyan and Francois (2019) entitled ‘When the waves meet the trees: A response 
to Jacques and List’ (pp. 168-176). These authors are proponents of Historical Glottometry 




usually offered as an alternative to family trees, but, as suggested by the title, a modified 
version compatible with Jacques and List. Their conclusion therefore suggests innovations to 
traditional practices on both sides. This has parallels with the biological literature, which is 
likewise finding flaws in Darwin’s tree of life, and arguing that it cannot account for all 
species, prokaryotes in particular, as argued, for example, by Bapteste, E. et al. (2009) in the 
article ‘Prokaryotic evolution and the tree of life are two different things’. This same point is 
again in evidence in question SSIQ4JL, where Doctor List’s questionnaire response to a 
question on the tree model appears to contradict his stance in earlier papers authored by him. 
He confirms that the recent ‘Save the Trees’ article represents his current thinking on the 
matter, namely that the tree model is important, but in part insufficient. However, the 
“prokaryotic issue” again raises its head in SSIQ5JL via the matter of Lateral Gene Transfer 
(LGT), an oft-used parallel for “borrowing” in languages. Here, Doctor List asserts that the 
biological aspects of LGT and the linguistic aspects are far too different to allow for a direct 
comparison, going so far as to suggest that “the current approaches in biology suffer heavily 
from the fact that scholars just don’t know what is transferred and what is inherited”. This is 
clearly not a promising foundation on which to build. Despite this, Doctor List is still of the 
opinion that evolutionary biology and historical linguistics share many striking parallels 
(SSIQ6JL). 
In response to question SSIQ2JL, Doctor List acknowledged that the process-based 
analogies first promoted in his 2016 ‘Unity and Disunity’ paper had not borne fruit as 
initially hoped, and that it was still at times difficult to take inspiration from evolutionary 
biology. As to whether “biology is of more use to linguistics than linguistics is to biology” 
(SSIQ3JL) in the context of collaboration between the two disciplines, he notes that currently 
“linguists make a lot of use of algorithms proposed first for biology” but, with the exception 




studying languages would have been useful for biology”. The admission that “biology 
guarantees practically our funding by now” is perhaps a little worrying in terms of the 
supposed worth of purely linguistic research.  
Based on Doctor List’s claim that general evolution cannot be studied from within 
one discipline alone, Question SSIQ8JL asked whether we have now reached a stage where a 
full picture of evolution does, or soon will, exist. His response indicated some scepticism for 
two reasons, both of which are of great importance to Themes 2 and 4. Firstly, the belief that 
cultural evolutionists “ignore the specifics of evolution in the different fields, specifically 
linguistic phenomena like regular sound change” and secondly, that they “have a hard time to 
actually find parallels in other evolving systems than language”. He concluded by adding that 
“the wish to unify everything is at times leading to annoyingly simplifying accounts”. No 
specific examples were noted here, however the belief that there is a wish to unify everything 
in the first place is cause for some concern. When asked (SSIQ9JL) why we are unable to 
quantify how many cultures there are in the world. Doctor List replied that he honestly did 
not know and had never asked himself the question. Finally, when asked if he agreed with the 
assertion that culture is part of biology (SSIQ10L), Doctor List stated that it depends on the 
perspective but that he preferred to keep things distinct, and any unifying process would 
mean that not all evolution is biological, but overarching both the biological and linguistic.  
 
3.6.2 Semi-structured Interview with William Croft  
At the time of interview, William Croft was Professor in the Department of 
Linguistics at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, a position he has held since 2006. 
Prior to this, he worked as Professor and Assistant Professor at the Universities of 
Manchester and Michigan respectively. Professor Croft has been a prolific author for some 




change: an evolutionary approach which, as noted in the above literature review, is of 
particular relevance here. Consequently, the first half of this interview concerns itself with 
the responses to the questionnaire QBLE3, while the second deals almost exclusively with 
questions based on Professor Croft’s 2013 updated version of Chapter 2 of this book. 
When responding to SSIQ1WC, concerning possible contradictions in his answers on 
parallels between the biological and the linguistic worlds in the original questionnaire, 
Professor Croft confirmed his belief that “there is a common evolutionary model behind both 
biological and linguistic entities, but one must be careful as to the parallel instantiations of 
the elements of the common evolutionary model”. Therefore, Question 2 of QBLE3 had, in 
his view, proposed a wrong parallelism. This, then, was an example of the potential to draw 
false analogies, in this case, between terms such as “living”, “dead” and “genetically related”.  
In response to SSIQ2WC, when asked whether he was of the opinion that language 
change has its own specific characteristics which distinguish it from cultural evolution more 
generally, Professor Croft noted that he considered “language change to be a type of cultural 
transmission. This does not preclude the possibility that there are aspects of language that 
make linguistic transmission different from transmission of other cultural traits”, another 
point of great importance to Theme 4 which will be returned to in the later discussion section.  
As was the case with Doctor List above, Professor Croft was asked (SSIQ3WC) why 
we are unable to quantify how many cultures exist in the world.  He replied that “the 
population that defines the divergence of one cultural trait (say, language) is different from 
the population that defines the divergence of another cultural trait (say, religion)”. Indeed, 
this was in many ways the point of the question, as, if Tylor’s (1871) “complex whole” 
definition of culture is correct, we should expect the boundaries of cultural traits within these 
populations to largely coincide. Professor Croft’s response then continues to make several of 




“language”, and that some of the difficulty in quantifying “cultures” is due to the difficulty of 
defining the set of traits that constitutes a culture. Even so, the Murdock classification is put 
forward as an example of cultures being quantified.  
Moving on to differences and similarities between the natural and social sciences 
(SSIQ4WC), Professor Croft emphasises that “the usual distinguishing feature between 
natural sciences and social sciences and humanities is that the latter has as its domain of 
inquiry human social interaction and its products (language, music, political institutions, etc.), 
and the former does not”.  This is indeed the case. However, one of the central tenets of this 
dissertation is that this division is a manifestation of dualism (i.e. the remit of the humanities 
and social sciences is to study the “mental” world, while the natural sciences look after the 
“physical” one) and, by its very existence, not only implies that such a division is correct, but 
also institutionally promotes its continuation. Professor Croft, of course, has already noted 
that “natural sciences and social sciences/humanities are different, although they are not as 
different as some think” (QBLE3), offering us some hope of crossing this divide, although he 
sees no special affinity between biological and linguistic evolution in particular, claiming 
rather that “pretty much all of the social sciences/humanities share as many “curious 
parallels” with biological evolution” as does the study of language change (SSIQ5WC). All 
involve the replication of social practices via human interaction.  
The interview now turns to questions based on the revised Chapter 2 of Professor 
Croft’s Explaining language change: an evolutionary approach which has been put on his 
website. One quote from this chapter notes that “linguistic diversity is so great that it is 
impossible to establish any but the most general exceptionless, unrestricted universals of 
language” (SSIQ6WC). This is an attractive statement which instantly strikes a chord. 
Nevertheless, given the even greater numbers of biological species, Professor Croft was 




the affirmative, adding that, as with species, our knowledge of languages is confined to a 
relatively small sample.  
In SSIQ7WC, based on a quote from his revised chapter which notes that evolutionary 
theory when applied to language “provides a model of change that is not the result of the 
intentional behaviour of individual persons”, Professor Croft was asked whether lack of 
intent was a prerequisite for evolution. He replied that “intentions related to communicative 
success in interpersonal interaction are OK; intentions based on making the linguistic system 
"simpler" or more "elegant" are not”. Although the precise meaning of this distinction was 
not fully apparent, it has been taken to mean distinguishing between trying to make oneself 
more easily understood in a “natural” situation, as opposed to what might be described as 
“linguistic engineering”.   
SSIQ8WC concerned Professor Croft’s assertion that “only actual interbreeding 
ultimately matters for the definition of a species/language” (intelligible communication being 
the “interbreeding” required in the case of language). If so, then how should we define 
individuals with the potential to interbreed, who, for whatever reason, would be extremely 
unlikely to do so? The example given in the question was that of a male puma from British 
Columbia and a female from Patagonia. These would never interbreed in the wild but would 
nonetheless have the potential to do so, for example, under forced circumstances such as 
being captured and kept in the same zoo. Linguistic equivalents would include individuals 
who spoke the same language but who were unlikely to ever communicate with each other 
despite having the potential to do so. Professor Croft replied that drawing the line between 
populations in both biology and linguistics presents difficulties, but “what matters is presence 
of interbreeding vs. absence of interbreeding”. Whilst accepting that a lack of “interbreeding” 
between populations is a major factor in the ultimate creation of new species, this stance was 




interbreeding but do not necessarily do so. It could be argued that the limits of populations 
are already reflected by existing language and species barriers.  
As far as a general framework for linguistic, cultural and biological change is 
concerned, (SSIQ11WC) Professor Croft noted that he was of the belief that “such a 
framework exists” even if scholars did not necessarily agree on its structure. On the face of it, 
this appears to be a more optimistic stance on the issue than the one taken above by Doctor 
List (SSIQ8JL).  
 
3.6.3  Semi-structured Interview with Nathalie Gontier  
At the time of interview, Nathalie Gontier was Director of the Applied Evolutionary 
Epistemology Lab in the Centre for Philosophy of Science at the Faculty of Science of the 
University of Lisbon. She is also founder and editor-in-chief of the Springer book series on 
Interdisciplinary Evolution Research. Of particular interest to this dissertation is her work on 
the Applied Evolutionary Epistemology methodology. The following interview is a 
continuation of questionnaire QBLE4.  
When asked if dichotomies such as biological/cultural and animal/human played a 
part in the division of the academic world into natural sciences and social sciences/ 
humanities (SSIQ1NG), Professor Gontier affirmed that they did. As has already been noted 
in the above literature review, she confirmed that nineteenth century natural historians saw 
continuity between biological and cultural or linguistic evolution. Interestingly, she asserts 
that the cause was a synchronic/diachronic split within subjects like linguistics, anthropology 
and sociology which cut them off from their “evolutionary” counterparts. This point was also 
noted in the literature review by Aranoff (2017, p. 450), and it would indeed be highly ironic 
if evolution turned out to be the “dividing theory” of the social sciences, given that it is often 




With regard to whether networks offered a more efficient method of indicating shared 
relationships than the family tree model, Professor Gontier asserted that the latter model was 
very good at indicating vertical transfer, but not horizontal transfer, which was better 
represented by the former. “Both demonstrate different aspects of evolution and it is best to 
try and use both models when interpreting data” (SSIQ3NG). This is in at least partial 
agreement with Doctor List’s response in SSIQ4JL that the tree model is important, but in 
part insufficient.  
Turning to Professor Gontier’s Applied Evolutionary Epistemology framework 
(SSIQ5NG), she was asked whether complex items of technology which have clearly been 
intentionally produced for a specific purpose are examples of evolution or creation. She 
asserted in reply that “everything is the result of evolution, including our capacity to create 
technologies” and her response to the next question (SSIQ6NG) confirmed in unambiguous 
terms that, in her view, “everything” meant precisely that. Everything, including inorganic 
matter, evolves, and “today, being alive is not necessary to be recognized to be the subject of 
evolution”. Examples given by her of “dead” structures which evolve included DNA, 
languages, cultures and technologies. From the point of view of a neutral observer, it is 
difficult to disagree with the assertion that these items are not of themselves independently 
alive. Nevertheless, they all, in some way or other, interact with or are dependent upon living 
organisms for evolution, and do not, on their own, display what are, according to Alex 
Mesoudi, the three essential features of evolution, namely variation, competition and 
inheritance. Therefore, if inorganic matter is to be considered part of the subject matter of 
evolution, then a definition of some kind is required to determine what exactly distinguishes 
“evolution” from the much simpler concept of “change”. The course of a river may be said to 




be said to have “evolved”. There is clearly “modification” going on but very little of what 
could be described as variation, competition or inheritance.  
As was the case with the previous respondents, Professor Gontier was asked why we 
are unable to quantify how many cultures exist in the world (SSIQ8NG). Her response was of 
particular value and relevance, noting that people “do not agree upon how to define culture 
on the one hand, and on the other, because there are numerous variations”. Without going as 
far as the definition offered later in this essay, she nevertheless went on to add that “basically, 
every kind of hobby practised with more than two people can be understood as a culture”.  In 
addition, “age, gender, location, ethnic background, social stratification, jobs, hobbies, 
educational background can all function as a means to differentiate cultures. Yet, these 
distinctions can occur in a group where everyone speaks English”. This, in short, is an 
extremely convenient summary of why this work has deemed it unacceptable to use 
languages as a means of counting cultures. They simply do not correlate; not every culture 
has its own language and every language does not of itself possess a culture.  
This theme led to the essence of question SSIQ9NG, namely, “in your opinion, should 
language evolution and cultural evolution be treated as distinct?”.  Here, however, we see a 
casualty of the distinction between language and languages. The question was meant to refer 
to language change but Professor Gontier’s response clearly indicates that it was taken to 
mean the evolution of the generic human language faculty, and so this question in hindsight 
should have been worded better. In the final question (SSIQ10NG), Professor Gontier stated 
that cultural evolution and technological evolution shared as many parallels with biological 







3.7  Semi-structured Interviews from the Linguistic Ecology Questionnaire   
Respondents were again chosen for interview from those who had kindly noted that 
they were definitely or possibly available. This required the tailoring of further bespoke 
questions based upon the answers to the initial questionnaire, as well as articles written by 
each individual contributor. The three interviews which resulted from the linguistic ecology 
questionnaire are shown in this section.   
 
3.7.1  Semi-structured Interview with Salikoko Mufwene   
At the time of interview, Salikoko Mufwene was Frank J. McLoraine Distinguished 
Service Professor in the Department of Linguistics at the University of Chicago. Professor 
Mufwene has, either individually or collaboratively, authored and edited academic 
publications for over forty years, and specialises particularly in the development of creoles 
and language evolution. It is this aspect which is of the greatest relevance to this essay, 
especially as raised in his seminal 2001 work The Ecology of Language Evolution, a book 
considered essential to the literature review, and referred to again in the following interview, 
which is a continuation of questionnaire QEL3. 
In response to SSIQ1SM, Professor Mufwene acknowledged that although he had at 
one point believed he had been the first to analogize languages with species (as opposed to 
Schleicher’s organisms for instance), he later discovered that this had been done in the 
nineteenth century by Herman Paul. Indeed, Darwin’s “curious parallels” could be considered 
another example. This perhaps serves as confirmation of the point made in the earlier 
interview with Professor Gontier that nineteenth century naturalists saw continuity between 
biological and cultural or linguistic evolution (SSIQ1NG).  
When asked whether, despite his belief that language falls under the overall category 




its own distinct characteristics (SSIQ2SM), Professor Mufwene replied that it could,  
although “language also shares some characteristics with other cultural domains, for instance, 
with music in being compositional and being learnable.” His response to the next question, 
however, (SSIQ3SM) was not in agreement with the proposition that design and evolution are 
mutually exclusive, given that, in cultural fields, “practitioners innovate constantly and 
introduce changes”.  He was clearly of the opinion that evolution could include planning.  
As was the case with the other interviews, Professor Mufwene was asked why it is so 
difficult to quantify how many cultures exist in the world (SSIQ4SM). He responded by 
saying that “what should be quantified is not how many cultures there are but rather how 
many music styles there are, how many cooking/food processing styles there are, how many 
legal systems there are, how many religions or belief systems there are, etc”. This again is in 
keeping with the major theme mentioned above that cultures should not be envisaged as 
“complex wholes” but rather as collections of variable traits which do not necessarily overlap 
or correspond to each other. He went on to add that “two populations practicing different 
languages may share the same non-linguistic culture (more or less) and two populations 
practicing the same language may practice different non-linguistic cultures”, a point made not 
for the first time in these interviews, and rather similar to the equivalent one made by 
Professor Gontier.  
In SSIQ6SM, Professor Mufwene was asked why he disliked the term ecolinguistics 
and its perceived use, in his view, as an “advocacy movement”. He replied that he had found 
ecolinguistics “lacking in explanations while very strong in moralizing people about saving 
languages from endangerment and loss”. The assertion that advocacy does not explain how 
things happen or evolve suggests perhaps that academic scholarship should be kept apart 




Professor Mufwene has done much work on creolisation, and was asked whether the 
development of creoles was living evidence of language evolution in action (SSIQ7SM). He 
replied that it was, “definitely”, to such an extent that “creoles are prompting us loud and 
clear to reopen the books about language evolution”. Contact is central to the process of 
language change and speciation. On the related issue of loss due to language shift, Professor 
Mufwene had noted in The Ecology of Language Evolution that one of the reasons why 
languages die is because their speakers choose to speak other languages. He was asked 
whether “choose” was in fact an appropriate term given that, as far as acquiring our mother 
tongues is concerned at least, we do not choose them, but have them chosen for us 
(SSIQ8SM). His response conceded that “choose” was not necessarily the best term, and that 
speakers may find themselves “in situations where they have fewer and fewer opportunities 
to speak the relevant languages” even if they would like to. This was felt to be a point worth 
raising, as literature on language use often refers to speakers “choosing” their languages 
when they do no such thing, and also “agreeing” to the code in question when they may 
merely, not unlike songbirds, be largely displaying “conformist bias”.  
On reconciling the “physical” aspects of speech with the “mental” (SSIQ9SM), 
Professor Mufwene felt that there was an issue regarding “which had precedence over 
which”, but concluded that “an organized internalization of communicative practices” was 
probably more accurate than the outward execution of an internal system. As for Richerson 
and Boyd’s claim that “culture is part of biology”, Professor Mufwene did not agree with this 
statement (SSIQ10SM) preferring instead to think of it as a “consequence of biological 







3.7.2  Semi-structured Interview with Cynthia Rosenfeld  
At the time of interview, Cynthia (Cindy) Rosenfeld was a doctoral student at North 
Carolina State University. This was immediately seen as a refreshing opportunity to 
incorporate a different perspective into the interviews. She has published several articles in 
academic journals, including recently contributing two relevant articles on language and 
ecology which led to the initial contact in this case. The following interview refers to these, 
alongside other aspects of her research, and carries on from questionnaire QEL7.  
The interview with Ms Rosenfeld began by requesting more details of her background 
and experience. This was followed by a question based on one of her responses to the initial 
questionnaire where she claimed that “language may not be living the way a biological 
organism is, but language is of a biological organism”. This same question (SSIQ2CJ) 
subsequently asked whether she saw the products of living organisms as extensions of them, 
in similar vein to Richard Dawkins in The Extended Phenotype. She confirmed that this was 
the case and added that in her view “language is as natural and as evolving a process for 
humans as building bowers are for Vogelkops”.  
Moving on to issues regarding her work on the Endangered Languages Project in 
North Carolina, Ms Rosenfeld was asked (SSIQ3CJ) whether biodiversity was similarly 
endangered in the same geographical areas. She replied that she was “not sure how often the 
cases of linguistic endangerment/extinction and species endangerment/extinction coincide” 
but imagined that “a neoliberal value of progress often enters an area and affects both”. 
However, one aspect raised regarding the linguistic side of things was that “the pressure to 
speak English to be able to participate in English-bound institutions and practices is high”. 
This is worth bearing in mind as a factor related to the element of choice mentioned in the 
previous interview with Professor Mufwene. “Choosing” to speak a language and “being 




On the division of academic subjects into sciences and humanities (SSIQ5CR) Ms 
Rosenfeld noted that as a humanities major, she fell in love with science through 
communication, and is “still desperately trying to catch-up”. She added that “we have been 
specialized and siloed, and it can be hard to break out”. Ms Rosenfeld was then asked, in 
similar fashion to Professor Gontier, if dichotomies such as human/animal and culture/nature 
played a part in the division of the academic world into humanities and natural sciences in the 
first place (SSIQ6CR).  She replied that they did, and went on to give an example of “how 
humanities came to fear nature”, and were themselves the result of “human exceptionalism”. 
As for whether the use of “Earth-centered language” – a term used in one of her 
published articles - would ultimately benefit linguistic as well as biological diversity, 
(SSIQ8CR) Ms Rosenfeld replied that earth-centered language was “absolutely an invitation 
to explore the rich lingual diversity on this planet and learn how different words can lead to 
new understandings”. In SSIQ9CR, the use of the word “dirt” to mean both “soil” and “filth” 
was given as an example of the diverse meanings that a single word could convey. When 
presented with the possible different interpretations of the terms “ecolinguistics” and 
“language ecology” (SSIQ10CR) Ms Rosenfeld noted that she preferred “reserving 
“ecolinguisitics” for work done that focuses on how language represents ecology and 
ecological philosophy. I use “language ecology” to refer to how language is impacted by the 
environment.”  
 
3.7.3  Semi-structured Interview with Keith Moser 
At the time of interview, Keith Moser was Professor in Classical and Modern 
Languages and Literature at Mississippi State University, where he has held various roles 
since 2007. During this time, he has written prolifically, authoring five full-length books and 




interdisciplinary intersection between literature and science, and ecolinguistics, the last two 
of which, in particular, are relevant to Themes 3 and 4. The following interview refers to 
Professor Moser’s work and is a continuation of questionnaire QEL8.  
Due to a commitment in his article ‘An Ecolinguistic, Scientific, and Serresian 
Interpretation of Communication: The Importance of (Re)-Conceptualizing Language From a 
More Ecocentric Perspective’ to “unapologetically transcend traditional disciplinary 
boundaries” (SSIQ2KM), Professor Moser was asked if he saw any link between the concept 
of “academic boundaries” in established disciplines on the one hand, and “political 
boundaries” between nation-states on the other. His response confirmed that he did, noting 
that it was sometimes difficult to create legitimate classes that correspond to his research and 
teaching interests, “because some colleagues defend what they consider to be their sacred, 
sovereign territory tooth and nail”.  
On the issue of social complexity hypothesis in communication (SSIQ3KM) Professor 
Moser noted “that there does appear to be a correlation between social complexity and 
cognitive ability”. The complexity of human societies of course implies that this will have 
implications as far as the evolution of human language is concerned. In the same article, 
Professor Moser refers to what he calls “the primordial sounds of the earth”. Given the view 
expressed in Professor Gontier’s interview above that “everything evolves”, Professor Moser 
was asked (SSIQ4KM) whether these primordial sounds extended to inorganic matter. He 
explained that what he had in mind was “the importance of becoming attuned or reconnecting 
ourselves to the most essential sounds of the planet that we often dismiss as insignificant 
background noise”, but that the question of inorganic matter was one he felt he needed to 




On record as stating that “the disappearance of any non-human language is a 
potentially lethal catastrophe” (p. 20), Professor Moser was asked (SSIQ5KM) if he felt that 
non-human languages should fall within the remit of ecolinguistics. He replied that he did, 
and felt that ecolinguistics had a major role to play in “the deconstruction of the last form of 
human exceptionalism in the shape of language that has created a myopic and deadly sharp 
ontological gap between Homo sapiens and other species”. This is significant, given that 
Edward O. Wilson sees all human culture as being separated from animal behaviour by a 
matter of degree only, with the exception of language “which is truly unique”. Also, the 
responses to the earlier animal communication questionnaire showed that none of the 
respondents considered themselves to be linguists. 
Another of Professor Moser’s articles is entitled ‘Is Preserving Indigenous Languages 
and Cultures the Key to Avoiding the Impending Eco-Apocalypse?: An Ecolinguistic 
Reading of Le Clézio’s Le Rêve Mexicain’. In it, he mentions “non-anthropocentric thought 
systems”, and in SSIQ6KM he was asked if these were largely the product of indigenous 
peoples outside of “the West”. He responded by saying that in his experience “autochthonous 
civilizations whose existence still revolves around a direct, sensorial connection to the earth 
tend to view the world and their small place in it from a biocentric lens”.  Later in the same 
article Professor Moser added that “the budding and promising discipline of ecolinguistics is 
extremely diverse comprised of numerous subfields”. Given the divisiveness shown in some 
of the responses to the linguistic ecology questionnaire, he was asked in SSIQ7KM to define 
the scope of ecolinguistics as he sees it, particularly its relationship with “language ecology”. 
In response, he noted that he felt it was essential for ecolinguists to engage with non-human 
“languages” and try not to define the parameters of ecolinguistics in a narrow way. Although 
there is much to commend in this stance, care also needs to be taken to avoid an “anything 




Further on in the same article, Professor Moser contrasts the “narcissism, and extreme 
opulence” of dominant world languages with the “humility and importance of stewardship” 
on display in the languages of minority civilisations. He was asked (SSIQ8KM) whether 
indigenous peoples’ attitudes changed if they shifted language, or whether their traditional 
values were maintained but expressed through a different medium. Professor Moser 
speculated in response “that the language we speak on a regular basis without a passing 
thought influences how we think and act in the world”.   
On a similar theme, the Professor expressed a desire (SSIQ9KM) to see an embedding 
of “the more beneficial and sustainable environmental discourses of Amerindian civilizations 
into dominant Western languages”. This would of course require these worldviews to be 
expressed through the medium of those same Western languages. Given this, Professor Moser 
was asked if he nevertheless felt that preservation of linguistic diversity was a worthwhile 
end in itself for its own sake (SSIQ9KM). His response was an emphatic “yes”, as “when a 
language vanishes entirely, an invaluable vantage point for perceiving the world and our 
place in it is forever lost as well”.  
As with the other interviews, Professor Moser was asked for his opinion on 
dichotomies such as human/animal, mind/body and culture/nature (SSIQ10KM). In 
particular, he was asked whether these had led to a corresponding dichotomy between the 
sciences and the humanities in the academic world. He replied in the affirmative, going so far 
as to suggest that “our obsolete thought systems have yet to evolve to reflect the discoveries 
of modern science.  Owing to the schism between the hard sciences and the humanities, it is 
only recently that humanists have started to reengage with scientific erudition”. Insularity 
was held to be at the root of this problem, because “when placed in the light of modern 




3.8  Results of Biocultural Diversity Questionnaire  
The first question in this questionnaire, on the number of United Nations member 
states, was asked purely to establish the extent to which the perception, prevalent in Europe, 
that “every country has its own language” would feed back into the responses. That is, would 
the figures for the number of countries in the world and the number of languages in the world 
be similar? Bar for this, there would only have been 3 x 5 questions. As it turned out, of the 
quantifiable responses, Question 1: “Approximately how many member states of the United 
Nations are there in total?” received far more correct answers than any of the others, with 66 
participants out of 105 correctly noting that the United Nations has approximately 200 
members. This was in fact the only quantifiable question which received more correct than 
incorrect responses.  In addition, very few participants selected the higher-end numbers, with 
101 of them choosing a figure in the hundreds as opposed to the thousands. This suggests that 
there was a broad awareness of the number of United Nations members.  
The second question, regarding the number of UNESCO world heritage sites, 
received 33 correct responses. There are approximately 1,000 such sites in total. One 
respondent left this question unanswered and so the total number of responses on this 
occasion was 104. Answers were spread more evenly over all the choices on offer, albeit with 
a tendency to gravitate towards the centre.  
Just under half of respondents correctly noted that there are approximately 6,500 
extant species of mammal (Q. 3) with very few this time selecting the numbers towards the 
lower end of the spectrum. As with the United Nations question, then, albeit at the other end 
of the scale, there seemed to be a common-sense realisation that the correct answer in this 




In each of the remaining “how many?” questions, on conifers, languages and 
amphibians respectively (Q 4, 5 and 6), between 30 and 36 respondents chose the correct 
option. It is also worth noting that even though the majority of respondents selected an 
incorrect answer to all questions except the first one, the correct answer nevertheless received 
more responses than any of the other individual answers on each occasion.   
Table 23: Approximate numbers within different categories of biocultural diversity 
Category  Actual Number  Underestimate Correct Answer Overestimate 
UN Members  200  12 66 27 
Heritage Sites * 1,000 48 33 23 
Mammals  6,500 54 51 **0 
Conifers  650 43 30 32 
Languages* 6,500 69 35 **0 
Amphibians  6,500 69 36 **0 
*(These categories received 104 rather than 105 responses) 
** (These categories could not be overestimated as the correct answer was the highest one on offer)  
 
These stand in stark contrast, to the “what percentage?” questions (Q. 7 – 11), where the 
correct answer was not the highest scoring one on any occasion. The majority of respondents 
overestimated the threats to World Heritage Sites and mammals, but underestimated the 
threats to conifers, languages and amphibians. The levels of discrepancy are shown in the 






Table 24: Perceived threats to different categories of biocultural diversity* 
Category  Actual Threat Underestimate Correct Answer Overestimate 
Heritage Sites 5% 0 4  101 
Mammals  25% 23 19 63 
Conifers  33% 56 18 31 
Languages 40% 63 16 26 
Amphibians  40% 64 23 18 
*(all based on 105 responses) 
The Heritage Sites overestimate can largely be based on the fact that a relatively small 
proportion of 5% are classified as in danger in the first place. This is considerably lower than 
all the others. The threat to the diversity of the world’s mammals was, much as expected, 
overestimated by the majority, while conifers, languages and amphibians were, by contrast, 
considerably underestimated.  
Questions 12 – 16 asked how important it was for these different categories to be 
preserved. The choices on offer were: “extremely important”, “fairly important”, “not 
particularly important” and “not important at all”. These questions did not require any 
competition between categories, such as, for instance, asking respondents to list them in order 
of importance. It was therefore possible to choose “extremely important” in every case, and 
this is indeed what the majority did. It was nevertheless interesting to examine the number of 








Table 25: Importance of preserving different categories of biocultural diversity* 
Category  Extremely Fairly Not particularly Not at all 
Heritage Sites*  86 16 2  0  
Mammals  93 11 1 0 
Conifers  73 27 4 1 
Languages 84 14 7 0 
Amphibians  80 23 2 0 
*(this question received 104 responses as opposed to the 105 in every other case) 
Here again, mammals would seem to be the clear winners, followed by heritage sites. 
There did not seem to be a pattern of choosing the biological over the cultural per se or vice 
versa. Instead, different priorities appeared within the two, with mammals winning over 
conifers and amphibians, and heritage sites winning over languages. The relative lack of 
importance displayed towards conifers in particular is rather ironic, given that, as “the lungs 
of the world” it could be argued that all of the others, either directly or indirectly, depend 
upon these in order to survive.  The biocultural diversity questionnaire suggested no obvious 
prioritisation of the biological over the cultural, with attitudes more inclined to vary within 
these divisions than across them. It must be admitted that this came as something of a 
surprise. As far as factual knowledge is concerned, however, there are clearly gaps which, no 










4.  Discussions and Conclusion  
Having examined literature related to the subject matter under discussion, and having 
conducted original research, this final part will attempt to provide an overall summary and 
conclusion based on the four themes of this dissertation. In so doing, it will offer some new 
definitions of old terms, and reconsider some of the relationships between the academic 
disciplines which study them.  
 
4.1  Discussion on Language and Animal Communication  
Theme 1 briefly considered animal communication and its relationship to human 
language. We humans can be a very “centric” species, more than willing to place ourselves at 
the centre of everything. We have at various times been geocentric, thinking our earth was at 
the centre of the universe; anthropocentric, believing ourselves to be the only species made in 
the image of God; and ethnocentric, holding our own cultural attributes to be superior to 
those of all others. Lest we get too carried away, therefore, Jasanoff (2018) reminds us that 
“animals have had brains or brain-like structures for nearly five hundred million years; over 
80 percent of that time, the ancestors of sheep were also our ancestors, and their brains were 
one and the same” (p. 12).  
It was undoubtedly not that shared 80 percent of time, however, that saw the 
development of human language, a characteristic of ours where we have a particular tendency 
to emphasise our uniqueness. Keith Moser (SSIQ5KM) dislikes this tendency, considering it 
the last bastion of human exceptionalism. However even this bastion is coming under attack. 
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) have cautioned against an overzealous inclination to 
claim a trait as uniquely human without first confirming that this is so by examining the 
comparative data (p. 1572). Critical of a narrow focus on primates, they distinguish between 




and postulate that although the latter may be shown to be uniquely human, “most if not all of 
FLB is shared with other species” (p. 1578). In order to obtain a fuller understanding of the 
language faculty, interdisciplinary collaboration is required “to promote a stronger 
connection between biology and linguistics” (p. 1570).  
This sentiment would appear to be echoed by many. The responses to the questionnaire 
on animal communication indicate that the participants do not see themselves as linguists. 
Nevertheless, all of them have collaborated with linguists in the past, and are also largely of 
the opinion that human language should fall under the scope of animal communication (albeit 
with the proviso that language would still require its own specific discipline). Their research 
indicates that similarities in communication systems do not correlate to genetic distance 
between species, serving as confirmation that the nearest parallels to human language may 
not necessarily be found in our closest living relatives. This does not of course mean that 
primates’ cognitive processes in general are more distant, only the specific business of 
combining sounds or gestures for the purposes of communication. Regardless of this, there is 
increasing evidence that we have much to learn about human language from studying animal 
communication and vice versa.  
 
4.2.  Discussion on Language and Evolution  
None of the elements present within living things are exclusive to them, as they are 
also found in the non-living world. All life on Earth, for example, is carbon-based, but carbon 
is also found in “dead” things such as diamonds and graphite. Nathalie Gontier does not 
distinguish between natural history and evolution (SSIQ5NG) nor believe that evolution is 
restricted to organic matter (SSIQ6NG). It may ultimately be shown, then, that the evolution 
of living things is just one of many kinds, also extendable to include inorganic matter. 




between the biotic and the abiotic is somehow false, or that the organic and inorganic evolve 
in the same way. This same principle extends to within the biotic world itself. There is a 
reason why “life” is subdivided into domains, kingdoms, phyla and so on. There are 
differences between them, which may require them to be treated separately. 
Evolution leading to speciation and extinction is common to both languages and 
biological species, and therefore often able to be represented by a family tree diagram. 
Family tree models, however, may not be appropriate in every evolutionary scenario, as 
testified by several of the contributors to the above interviews. Johann-Mattis List (SSIQ4JL). 
William Croft (QBLE3 – Q. 10) and Nathalie Gontier (SSIQ3NG) all acknowledge that, to 
varying degrees, the tree model is simultaneously both important and also insufficient. This is 
particularly so in cases where horizontal/lateral gene transfer is common, and difficulties 
arise in establishing what has been transferred vertically as opposed to laterally (SSIQ5JL). It 
may be, for example, that speciation of the family tree kind may be appropriate for eukaryotic 
organisms but not prokaryotes. Bapteste et al (2009, p. 1) make the rather stark claim that 
“prokaryotic evolution and the tree of life are two different things, and we need to treat them 
as such”. Prokaryotic life is no less life because it is unicellular and less complex, but 
horizontal/lateral gene transfer is commonplace here. Nevertheless, the possibility that 
Darwin’s tree of life does not extend to all life forms does not mean that he was wrong in 
those areas where he was right!  
As far as overarching links between biology and language are concerned, we once 
again see some similarities in the messages emanating from different scholars. William Croft 
advocates a common model (QBLE3) which “subsumes” the biological, the cultural and the 
linguistic, but also advises caution when applying this model to these different domains 
(SSIQ1WC). In similar fashion, Salikoko Mufwene favours treating the biological and the 




(SSIQ10SM). This seems like very sound advice, otherwise, as noted by Johann-Mattis List, 
the specifics of the different fields will be ignored (SSIQ8JL). It will later be suggested that 
this is every bit as true within culture as it is within biology, as well as between the two.  
 
4.3  Discussion on Language and Ecology  
The relationship between language and the environment formed the basis of Theme 3. 
For the purposes of the present project, “environment” will be here defined as everything 
external to the unit in question. That unit may often, but not always, be an organism. It could 
equally be a cell, an organ, a language, or, indeed, an inanimate object. As far as any such 
unit is concerned, it should be emphasised that everything external to it forms part of its 
environment (so that an “internal environment” would be a contradiction in terms) and there 
is no point at which a given unit does not interact with its environment, whether such 
interaction involves sleeping in a chair, fleeing from a predator, receiving signals, or being 
blown about by the wind.   
Turning to the responses to the linguistic ecology questionnaire, some of the 
criticisms made seem rather harsh, if not unfair, especially those concerning the use of the 
term “language ecology” to refer to solely linguistic interaction. If “birdsong ecology” can be 
considered a valid aspect of ecology overall (Strauss, 2019), then “language ecology” must 
clearly also be so considered. Although the wider environmental context of languages must 
be remembered, there is no reason why language interaction cannot also be studied for its 
own sake, whilst acknowledging that such interaction is itself part of a wider environment. 
No animal species, for example, lives in isolation, all of them interact with other species and 
the inorganic environment, but that is no justification for objecting to the study of, for 




Some comments also seem to imply that certain terms are “owned” by biological 
sciences and should not be interfered with by other disciplines. However, their use in these 
fields may well have been taken (and taken metaphorically to boot) from a more general 
context. According to the Online Etymology Dictionary, for example, the word “genetic” was 
first recorded in 1831, with the meaning “pertaining to origins” and it is hard to envisage 
ecologists objecting to the suggestion that languages have origins. Seen in this way, language 
ecology is no more or no less than a particular aspect of human ecology, which is in turn a 
particular aspect of ecology as a whole. Lack of a precise definition of the exact nature of 
“language ecology” versus “ecolinguistics” is no doubt causing problems, nevertheless, the 
“linguistic” versus “biological” differences seen in some responses make this field a likely 
candidate for one of the many casualties of dualism, with most of the negativity, in this 
instance, being shown by the biological sciences towards the social. 
 
4.4.  Discussion on Language and Culture  
The relationship between language and culture formed the basis of Theme 4, and was 
raised on numerous occasions in the questionnaires and interviews. The definition of culture, 
however, has also been the topic of vigorous academic debate. In 2012, Helen Spencer-Oatey 
of the University of Warwick compiled a collection of quotations in her publication What is 
culture? It begins by acknowledging that “culture is a notoriously difficult term to define” (p. 
1) with 164 different definitions recorded in the 1950s. A century of successive attempts by 
anthropologists had failed to reach agreement. One of the definitions on offer is her own, 
shown here:  
Culture is a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, 
policies, procedures and behavioural conventions that are shared by a group of 
people, and that influence (but do not determine) each member’s behaviour and 
his/her interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of other people’s behaviour (Spencer-





Spencer-Oatey quotes Edward Tylor’s famous “complex whole” (1871) definition, noting it 
as his greatest legacy. According to this view, “cultures should be thought of as integrated 
wholes – that is, cultures are coherent and logical systems, the parts of which to a degree are 
interrelated… its components are more than a random assortment of customs” (Spencer-
Oatey, 2012, pp. 14-15), therefore, “it follows logically that a change in one part of the 
system is likely to produce concomitant changes in other parts of the system” (p. 15).  
The “complex whole” definition of culture as originally championed by Tylor (1871) 
is here rejected as fundamentally flawed and demonstrably false, and some of the comments 
made by contributors to this work regarding how cultures should be quantified may help to 
illustrate why (without implying that they necessarily agree with this stance). Nathalie 
Gontier, for example, makes the succinct remark that any pastime practised by more than two 
people can be understood as a culture (SSIQ8NG), while William Croft notes the difficulties 
involved in trying to establish the set of traits that constitutes a culture (SSIQ3WC). Salikoko 
Mufwene lists individual characteristics such as music, cooking styles, legal and religious 
systems, and notes that these, rather than “cultures” are what should be quantified 
(SSIQ4SM). He also adds that language and culture shifts do not go hand in hand 
(SSIQ2SM). These comments, in addition to such traditional academic ventures as spending 
over a century inconclusively trying to find the “homeland” of the Indo-Europeans based on 
the belief that speakers of a given language can be traced via their non-linguistic material 
culture, should be sufficient to support the view that different cultural practices disseminate 
separately, and are not interconnected components of a “complex whole”.  
It was noted above that 164 proposed definitions of the word culture had been counted 
in one particular study. On this basis, it has been assumed that proposing a 165th could not do 
much harm, and so the definition of culture suggested here is that which is learned via 




upon, and so “culture” is not the same thing as “learned behaviour”. This definition allows 
for the possibility of culture being reduceable to the individual, and acquirable by any 
organism with the capacity to learn, from any environmental source, including directly from 
the abiotic environment or from other species. Creanza, Kolodny and Feldman, (2017) note 
that “numerous nonhuman species also exhibit cultural transmission” (p. 7782) and that in 
many social scenarios “new information enters a population via trial-and-error learning or 
individual interactions with the environment” (p. 7783). Current definitions demand that 
transmission take place for said information to count as culture. However, the stance taken 
here is that variation in non-innate solutions to the challenges of life is what makes for 
cultural traits, which are born when they become habitual, even if only by one individual. The 
highly social nature of human life then makes the transmission of useful innovations virtually 
inevitable, but this is a consequence, not a cause. If Hermit A hunts with a bow and arrow, 
makes his bed from animal skins, creates fire by rubbing sticks together and prays to the Sun 
God, while Hermit B hunts with spears, makes his bed from leaves, creates fire with flint 
stones and prays to the Rain God, then they have two different cultures, transmission or not.  
Language, of course, being a system of communication, inevitably does depend on 
transmission. What then, is the relationship between languages and (other elements of) 
culture? Although the generic capacity for human language is clearly an inherited part of our 
physiology, it is equally clear that the individual languages we speak are learned. William 
Croft (SSIQ2WC) considers language to be a type of cultural transmission, but adds that “this 
does not preclude the possibility that there are aspects of language that make linguistic 
transmission different from transmission of other cultural traits.”  In similar fashion, Nathalie 
Gontier suggests that language and culture are “sufficiently distinct to look into their 
evolution separately” (SSIQ9NG). If this is indeed the case, then there must be a need, at 




4.5  Conclusion 
So is language part of culture, and culture part of biology? And why stop at biology? 
As noted above, living things are made of the same “stuff” as non-living things, and subject 
to the same generic “laws of nature”. It could, then, be argued that there is no need for an 
academic discipline of biology. In principle, to paraphrase Edward O. Wilson (albeit in a very 
different context) it could be “shrunk to a specialized branch of physics”. The reason why this 
is not done, of course, is because although the study of life is a part of natural science, it also 
has sufficient specific features to make it stand apart from all other such sciences. There is no 
danger in acknowledging both of these positions, but difficulties arise when one is accepted 
and the other rejected. For example, living things possess many characteristics which apply to 
them and them alone, however, no biologist would argue that they are subsequently not 
subject to the more general “laws” of, say, gravity or thermodynamics.  
This continuum, however, appears to break down when the biological meets the 
cultural. For example, the traditional “four-field” discipline of anthropology consists of 
biological, cultural, archaeological and linguistic anthropology. The first two of these, in 
particular, have been “at war” with each other (Fearn, 2008) over whether or not “Darwinian 
evolutionary theory guides research into human behaviour” (ibid) and, indeed, over whether 
anthropology is a science or not (Dreger, 2010). Some practitioners of cultural anthropology 
are of the opinion that human culture is not a part of human biology, but instead stands apart 
from it. The “laws” of biology do not apply to them. The stance taken in this work, however, 
is that just as biology is part of nature, so culture is a part of biology, a stance broadly in 
agreement with Richerson and Boyd (2005). However, the very label “dual-inheritance” has 
about it a suggestion of dualism, i.e. there is one thing called biology which evolves one way, 




such a manner should be avoided, as, if, in accordance with Richerson and Boyd “culture is a 
part of biology” then logic also dictates that cultural evolution is part of biological evolution.   
Nevertheless, just as “life” can be subdivided into three or more domains which are 
all living things but may evolve in different ways, the suggestion here is that the all-
encompassing term “culture” can similarly be subdivided into (at least) three domains of its 
own, each of which is internally autonomous, that is, changes to one do not cause changes to 
the others. “Language” is here treated as one of these domains, being sufficiently discrete to 
warrant its separate treatment from (other aspects of) culture, with culture sufficiently 
discrete to warrant its separate treatment from (other aspects of) biology, and organic matter 
in turn sufficiently discrete to warrant its separate treatment from inorganic matter. Figure 5 
shows a proposed outline of some of these “cultural domains”. 
Figure 5: Proposed “domains” of culture
 
“Beliefs” here incorporate legal, political, religious, economic and other social 
systems, which are based upon assumptions of “right and wrong”. Some of these may change 
independently, or alternatively have a knock-on effect on each other. Many countries, for 




keeping with their political or religious beliefs. Similarly, there may be financial and legal 
incentives for couples to marry rather than live together which likewise reflect social values.  
“Technology” is the third domain, defined here as the use of materials from the 
environment as tools. Items of aesthetic value will be treated as “tools” as they too have their 
uses and have been produced by the use of technology. Numerous academics, including 
contributors to this work, have referred to language itself as a technology. Dediu et al (2013 
p. 310), for example, describe it as a form of “coordinative technology”, Salikoko Mufwene 
calls languages “technologies for communication” (SSIQ2SM) and Cynthia Rosenfeld 
(SSIQ7CR) expresses the opinion that “language is a human technology” with technology 
conceptualised as “arts and tools one uses for living”. With all due respect to these scholars 
(and in full agreement with Cynthia Rosenfeld’s conceptualisation), language is not here 
treated as technology, on the basis that only that which is taken from the environment should 
be so considered. Although also eventually becoming part of the environment, language 
originates within our bodies (as production must precede reception) and is therefore 
considered part of our physiological inheritance instead. This same distinction would apply to 
“tools” inherent in other animals such as echolocation, web spinning, or teeth and claws.  
The essential point, however, is that languages, beliefs and technologies are not 
interconnected in a complex whole and can change independently. In particular, technology 
and language are “value-free”. A precision knife may be used by a robber to take a life, or by 
a surgeon to save one, and the words “I fully oppose capital punishment” do not represent 
any linguistic progression from “I fully support capital punishment” although, in Europe, at 
least, this is meant to signify social progression (Belarus is the only European country not 
allowed to join the Council of Europe due to its retention of the death penalty). Similarly, the 
sentence “my smartphone is out of battery” is no more linguistically complex than “my pen is 




The domains shown are not meant to be exhaustive, but rather an example of a principle 
which argues that culture needs its own established taxonomy to avoid the misinterpretations 
and simplifications referred to by William Croft and Johann-Mattis List. There are other 
cultural features, in particular “rituals and traditions” such as dance forms and cooking styles, 
which do not fit easily into any of the domains above, and suggest the need for additional 
ones. However, the task of fully allocating different domains to all cultural traits is beyond 
the scope of this project.  
All of the above “domains” will change by descent with modification, and different 
mechanisms such as mutation, migration and drift will apply. Nevertheless, the mechanism 
which perhaps distinguishes them most of all, and which no doubt was behind Darwin’s 
“curious parallels” remark, is the extent of the process of selection which operates on them. 
Of the three cultural domains shown in Figure 5, it is here suggested that:  
• languages change in the manner most like natural selection, via subconscious 
manipulation by their speakers in a competitive environment; 
• social beliefs change in a more “artificially” selected manner, including attempts at 
changing the unchangeable (e.g. murder is both illegal, and committed, universally);  
• technology changes in the manner least like (indeed, very unlike) natural selection, as 
a result of its significant element of guided variation.   
Indeed, some technologies in particular are more akin to acts of creation than evolution. 
Humans can not of course “create” in the true sense of the word, only modify an existing 
environment, however, we cannot say that human technology “has no purpose in mind” 
(Dawkins, 1986, p. 5) “does not plan for the future” (ibid) and “has no vision” (ibid). We 
cannot say that technology “should not be interpreted as progress” (Mufwene, 2001, loc. 
2238) when it can be interpreted as precisely that. It is more than feasible, however, to claim 




Many discussions on language change concentrate on phonology or lexis, however 
some of the most “evolution-like” aspects of language involve how words, or parts of words, 
are put together in combination in grammatical structures, both syntactic and morphological.    
According to Dediu et al (2013) “grammatical structure is largely “under the radar” as far as 
conscious manipulation by speakers is concerned” (p. 311). However, its being under the 
radar is exactly what gives it the features of evolution. William Croft (SSIQ7WC) states that 
an evolutionary model of language “provides a model of change that is not the result of the 
intentional behaviour of individual persons” and this unintentionality should in itself be 
significant enough to treat language separately. Some of Pinker’s “language instinct” claims 
go too far in the “innate” direction, especially his claim that language is “qualitatively the 
same in every individual” (1994, p. 18). This, however, should not be counterbalanced by 
going just as far in the opposite direction and sacrificing language particularism on the altar 
of a unified cultural evolution theory. Biology, culture and language each have their “square 
pegs” which do not fit easily into the wider accepted narrative. Prokaryotes do not sit neatly 
on the branches of the tree of life, cultural evolution does not comfortably mirror biological 
evolution, and language change is not equivalent to cultural change. This does not mean that 
prokaryotes are not living things, or that culture is not part of biology, or that language is not 
part of culture. However, what it does mean is that we may have to modify our understanding 
of the taxonomic relationship between prokaryotes and other living things, as well as between 
culture and physiology, and between language and culture. Each of these may indeed have to 
be treated separately to the other categories with which they share a wider taxonomy. In the 
specific case of language and culture, to paraphrase Salikoko Mufwene (SSIQ10SM), we 
should treat the cultural and the linguistic in the same way when they are the same, and 




In his book The Unfolding of Language, Guy Deutscher makes the following 
observation about the case system in Latin:  
There was one question I could not get out of my mind: who could have dreamt 
up all these endings in the first place? And if they weren’t invented, how else 
could such an elaborate system of conventions ever have arisen? I had childish 
visions of the elders of ancient Rome, sitting in assembly one hot summer day 
and debating what the case endings should be (Deutscher, 2005, loc. 96-98). 
 
And this is precisely the point, the elders of ancient Rome did not sit in assembly debating 
what the case endings should be, but they no doubt did sit in assembly debating which laws 
should be enacted, which religious beliefs would or would not be sanctioned, appropriate 
codes of dress, the state of the economy and so on, and did so in a language not planned by 
any of them. Who decides whether a language should be SVO, VSO, VOS or OVS? What 
makes accessible information English but information accessible French?  
Beckner et al (2009) note that as far as language is concerned, “despite its lack of overt 
government, instead of anarchy and chaos, there are patterns everywhere. Linguistic patterns 
are not preordained by God, genes, school curriculum, or other human policy” (p. 18). This is 
indeed so. However, apart from the fact that with a couple of tweaks this quote could quite 
easily have been made about the natural world, those linguistic patterns must be determined 
by something, otherwise there would be no patterns. Therefore, on the assumption that these 
languages are not primarily being consciously manipulated by their speakers, then, apart from 
copying errors, some form of selection must be responsible for the changes which happen to 
languages over time. The term “linguistic selection” has been used by William Croft (1996) 
and this seems ideal. However, given that the business of communicating in social life is part 
and parcel of “natural” life for many animals, and humans in particular, then there seems to 
be no reason in principle why linguistic selection should be incompatible with natural 
selection, if not indeed a specific element of it. Given the importance of language in human 




Nathalie Gontier (SSIQ1NG) has already referred to the holistic approach of nineteenth 
century scholars. This was then subsequently interrupted by a century of ever-increasing 
academic specialisation and fragmentation. In particular, a solid division was formed between 
“natural” sciences and “social” sciences (one which implies that human society is in some 
way “unnatural”). Recent decades have seen some crossover between the two, but the chasm 
remains wide. As Kravchenko (2016) notes: 
The ousting of the ideology of holism from scientific research, and the persisting 
reliance on analytical methods have led to an extreme fragmentation of our 
knowledge of the world and language as a specific domain of human existence in 
this world which sets humans radically apart from all other known biological 
species (p. 103).  
He adds that there is a “methodological dead-end in the humanities in general, and in 
linguistics in particular” (p. 104) which can only be escaped from by acknowledging that 
“language as a phenomenon is grounded in human biology” (ibid). There is little chance of 
such an escape if human exceptionalism continues, and, as Keith Moser has already pointed 
out (SSIQ10KM), it is rife in our existing academic structures, which offer one field of study 
for human beings, and another for “everything else”, as illustrated in Table 26:  
Table 26: Biological Sciences and their Social Science “equivalents”: 
Biological Sciences  Social Sciences  
Animal Communication  Linguistics  
Ethology  Psychology  
Zoology  Anthropology 





If we cannot knock down the twin pillars of the sciences and the humanities, we 
should at least attempt to build a bridge between them in the form of “biosocial sciences”, 
which would include those disciplines which have both a biological and social element to 
them. The comprehensive study of language should of course be among them. Nor should we 
exclude the possibility that linguistic evolution shares many parallels with biological 
evolution because it is biological evolution. There can be little doubt that the communication 
system of any other animal species which changed by descent with modification would be 
viewed in this way. Languages, like species, are complex adaptive systems (Beckner et al. p. 
1), they influence and are influenced by their environment, they change gradually over time, 
and split into new forms by methods which were, and still are, curiously parallel. So, let this 
work end as it started, from the horse’s mouth, so to speak, with a quote from the same author 
and the same book: “the survival or preservation of certain favoured words in the struggle for 
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